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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three self contained chapters in the area of
empirical macroeconomics.
Chapter 2 examines the behaviour of the volatility of the structural shocks
and the macroeconomic variables in the post-reform period in India in a time-
varying framework. A time varying parameters structural vector autoregres-
sion with stochastic volatility model is used to investigate the evolving dynam-
ics of the macroeconomy of India in the post-reform period. We detect a sharp
reduction in estimated stochastic volatility during the post-reform years for
all shocks and variables. In terms of the stochastic volatility, we find that the
period 2001 to 2006 seems to have the lowest volatility in the whole sample and
can be dubbed as the short ‘Great Moderation’ period of India. We find that
the estimated stochastic volatility of supply shocks is more than the demand
shocks. We also note that demand shocks rather seem to be persistent than
supply shocks during the period from 2007-14.
Chapter 3 explores the role of nominal GDP as an implicitly preferred
monetary policy target in the US during the Great Moderation period. Mone-
tary policy via stabilization of inflation expectations by targeting inflation, has
been argued as one of the prominent factors contributing for the Great Mod-
eration in the U.S. Studies using Taylor rule type monetary policy reaction
functions have found inflation to be the major target variable of the Federal
Reserve. This study counters this view, and shows that for accomplishing its
objective of stabilizing inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve was instead
implicitly targeting nominal GDP. This claim is corroborated by estimating
different variants of nominal GDP rules, which then is compared with Taylor
rules using both ex-post revised data and real time briefing forecasts of FOMC.
The results counter the conventional view, and observe that post Volcker era
or during the period of Great Moderation (1984-2007), the Federal Reserve
had a stronger implicit preference for nominal GDP as compared to inflation.
Chapter 4 examines whether nominal GDP can pass the forecasting test
to be a monetary policy framework. Forecast targeting became an important
component of central banks from 1990’s onwards as a systematic approach to
monetary policy deliberations and as a good communication medium with the
vii
public. Any robust monetary policy regime has to have good forecasting per-
formance of its nominal anchor. Nominal GDP targeting has been suggested
as a suitable alternative to the present inflation ‘targeting’ monetary policy
framework. But as a good framework its nominal anchor should have good
forecasting ability. This chapter tries to compare the forecast performance
between the nominal anchors of inflation and nominal GDP targeting regimes
for U.S. This task is undertaken by using a series of models from simple au-
toregressive models to state space models. U.S Inflation is hard to forecast,
but it seems that NGDP is much more harder to forecast.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
India embarked on the process of major economic reforms starting in 1991 in
the aftermath of a severe balance of payment crisis. These reforms included
wide ranging changes in the financial sector, with a slew of measures such as
dismantling of interest rate controls, introduction of capital adequacy require-
ments along with prudential norms for banks, and other measures for increasing
competition. This transition from a closed regime to a relatively open regime
must have changed the volatility of the structural shocks and macroeconomic
variables. In the second chapter, we examine the volatility of three structural
shocks and macroeconomic variables in the post-reform period from 1991 to
2014.
For undertaking this task we use a Bayesian time-varying parameter struc-
tural VAR with stochastic volatility, following the works of Primiceri (2005),
Canova and Gambetti (2005), Gambetti, Pappa and Canova (2006) and Be-
nati and Mumtaz (2007). We use the index of industrial production, CPI
inflation and call money rate to investigate the nature of the volatility and
the implications of structural shocks. The structural shocks that are identified
using sign restriction techniques display different features at different points
1
in time. One of the issues with the Indian data is availability of short time
series. We could not use a TVP-VAR-SV framework before 1991 to understand
the evolution of volatility due to lack of interest rate data. For understanding
the nature of volatility of variables from a longer time period, we have used a
univariate AR(1) time-varying stochastic volatility model from 1970-2014. We
examine the stochastic volatility of three macroeconomic variables, industrial
output(IIP), consumer price index (CPI), and wholesale price index (WPI).
Results from the second chapter show that time variation is an important
feature of the major macroeconomic variables in India. During the post-reform
period from 1991 onwards, we detect a sharp reduction in estimated stochastic
volatility for all shocks and variables. Interestingly, during the East Asian cri-
sis the volatility surge is much higher than observed during the recent global
financial crisis. We find that CPI inflation response to monetary policy shocks
are somewhat consistent with industrial output. This similar response in both
the variables in terms of synchronous fluctuations in volatility was also ob-
served with the univariate stochastic volatility model for both the variables.
We also note that demand shocks rather seem to be persistent than supply
shocks during the period from 2007-2014. In terms of the stochastic volatility
we find that the period from 2001 to 2006 seems to have the lowest volatility
in the whole sample and can be dubbed the short ‘Great Moderation’ period
of India. Estimated stochastic volatility of the supply shocks is more than the
demand shocks.
In the third and fourth chapters, we focus on the monetary policy frame-
work in the US economy. The ‘Great Moderation’ has been considered a
period of reduction in macroeconomic volatility in the US (Stock and Watson,
2002), Bernanke (2004). Many factors have been attributed for the decline
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in macroeconomic volatility including inventory dynamics (McCarthy and Za-
krajsek, 2007), smaller macroeconomic shocks (Stock and Watson, 2002) and
stronger preference for low inflation in the monetary policy process (Clarida,
Gali and Gertler, 2000; Bernanke (2004). One of the prominent factors that
has been argued for contributing to the Great Moderation in the US, is the
stabilization of the inflation expectations by focusing on inflation. Monetary
policy rules such as the Taylor rule (2003) embody such hypothesis.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000); Stock and Watson (2002); and Bernanke
(2004), have argued that post-Volcker or during the Great Moderation period,
the monetary policy preferences of the Federal Reserve were much more sen-
sitive and tuned to changes in expected inflation and overwhelmingly found it
to be the preferred policy target of the Federal Reserve. But was the Federal
Reserve just implicitly targeting inflation? Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve
chairman during this period, stated in one of his speeches in 1992 that the
Federal Reserve should target NGDP growth rate at 4.5%. A natural question
to ask is whether the Federal Reserve was implicitly targeting nominal GDP.
The third chapter of this thesis, answers this question.
The third chapter estimates a forward looking nominal GDP rule for the
US, spanning from 1960-2007. This study shows that for accomplishing its
objective of stabilizing inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve was implic-
itly targeting nominal GDP. This claim is corroborated by estimating different
variants of nominal GDP rules, which then is compared with Taylor rules us-
ing both ex-post revised data and real time briefing forecasts of FOMC. The
results counter the conventional view, and observe that post Volcker era or
during the period of Great Moderation (1984-2007), the Federal Reserve had
a stronger implicit preference for nominal GDP as compared to inflation.
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Chapter 4 explores whether nominal GDP can pass the forecasting test to
be a good monetary policy framework. Optimal nominal GDP targeting has
been found to be superior to inflation targeting frameworks such as the Taylor
rule (Jensen, 2002) and also more efficient especially when the economy is hit
by a cost push shock, supply shocks or shocks to country risk (Henderson and
McKibbin, 1993; Jensen, 2002). Nominal GDP targeting has the operational
advantage as there is no requirement for having an output gap measurement.
For nominal GDP targeting to be implemented as a monetary policy regime,
its nominal anchor should have good forecasting ability. Forecast targeting
became an important component of central banks from the 1990s onwards as
a systematic approach to monetary policy deliberations and as a good com-
munication medium with the public. Any robust monetary policy regime has
to have good forecasting performance of its nominal anchor.
The fourth chapter compares the forecast performance between the nominal
anchors of inflation and nominal GDP targeting regimes for the US. This task
is undertaken by using a series of models including Autoregressive models, Inte-
grated Moving Average models, Vector Autoregression model and Unobserved
Components model. The forecasting performance shows that US inflation is
hard to forecast, but it seems that nominal GDP is much harder to forecast.
1.1 Thesis Outline
This thesis contains three self contained chapters. The chapters are organized
as follows,
• Chapter 2 - Time-varying Macroeconomic Dynamics of the Indian Econ-
4
omy
• Chapter 3 - Implicit Central Bank Targets: Nominal GDP and the Great
Moderation
• Chapter 4 - Does Nominal GDP pass the forecastability test for being
the future monetary policy framework?
• Chapter 5 - Conclusion.
5
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Chapter 2
Time-varying macroeconomic
dynamics of the Indian economy
2.1 Introduction
India embarked on the process of major economic reforms starting in 1991 in
the aftermath of a severe balance of payment crisis. These reforms included
wide-ranging changes in the financial sector, with a slew of measures such
as dismantling of interest rate controls, introduction of capital adequacy re-
quirements along with prudential norms for banks, and other measures for
increasing competition. These reforms brought in more efficiency in financial
intermediation and also led to a substantial reduction in the cost of banking.
During the initial phase of reforms, during the 1990s, many changes were
also introduced in the monetary policy framework by the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI). In terms of its liquidity management operations, the RBI shifted
from direct instruments to indirect instruments, and also moved from multiple
indicator regime to using the interest rate as its most important instrument
for monetary policy. This transition was helped by the introduction of the
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liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) in 2004. More reform measures were also
unveiled, that smoothed the transition from a closed regulated regime to a
more open regime. This included deregulation of interest rates, auction-based
market borrowing programme of the government, the introduction of money
market instruments, the phasing out of ad hoc Treasury bills, replacement of
cash credits with term loans and there was a reduction in statutory reserve
requirements (Mohanty, 2012).
The single policy rate was only recently introduced by the RBI in 2011
with the weighted average call money rate being explicitly recognized as the
operating target. On January 2014, the RBI proposed a major overhaul of
the monetary policy framework in India from the ad hoc policy framework
to adopting inflation targeting as its primary policy target. Even if instru-
ments that are targeted are known it has been found in certain episodes in
India, that the mapping between the policy variables and objective variables
does not appear to work well. Or in other words, the transmission channel
of macroeconomic variables is somewhat weak. Studies related to India have
shown that the monetary transmission mechanism has become more efficient
during the post-reform years (Kalirajan and Singh, 2007; Aleem, 2010; Mo-
hanty and John, 2015).
The transmission channel of macroeconomic variables in emerging economies
have generally been found not to be that efficient. Mohanty and Klau (2001)
in their comprehensive study of emerging economies using data from 1980s and
1990s found that supply factors are more dominant and especially they found
inflation in these countries is driven more by supply-side factors. Regarding
India, most studies examine the workings of the monetary transmission mech-
anism and the impact of monetary policy shocks.
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Kalirajan and Singh (2007) examine the monetary transmission mechanism
during the post-reform years from January 1993 to March 2005. Using coin-
tegrated vector error correction method, they examined the effectiveness of
interest rates in the monetary policy framework. As discussed earlier, during
this period the liquidity adjusted facility and other major reforms had not
started to show the dominance of interest rates. Kalirajan and Singh (2007)
find that positive shock to industrial output (proxy for output) is followed
with an increase in interest rates after a lag of two periods. They argue that
a increase in interest rates from an output shock should be understood in the
context of tighter credit and saving situations. In the case of India, they argue
that tight credit, hence higher interest rates, exists due to overemphasis on
exchange rate management. Strong capital flows coupled with capital controls
make open market operation ineffective in controlling the exchange rate due
to the dominant effect of sterilization. So they argue that using sterilization to
control sharp nominal appreciation and increase in the interest rate to stabilize
inflation, makes it difficult to establish which effect dominates output. Mo-
hanty (2012) using a four-variable SVAR examines the monetary transmission
mechanism of India. He finds that with a monetary policy shock (call money
rate) RGDP decreases for a period of six to eight quarters.
Mohanty and John (2015) who wrote the first paper using time-varying
VAR for India, examine inflation dynamics from 1996Q4 to 2014Q1 using
five variables time-invariant SVAR and TVP-VAR-SV model. In their time-
invariant case, they find the response of inflation to output gap shock to in-
crease inflation, which lasts for around 7 quarters and then it falls. In their
study they do not find output gap to be significant. In the case of inflation
shock they find that interest rates ( weighted average call money rates) in-
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creased just for the first quarter then it sharply falls and stays below for the
next 4-5 quarters. In the TVP-VAR-SV model, where the identification is
based on Cholesky decomposition, the time-varying accumulated impulse re-
sponse of an output gap shock to inflation shows a positive response of inflation
and inflation seems to be persistently positive. They also find that one per-
centage point shock in the interest rates (call money rates) leads to a 120 basis
points fall in inflation that lasts for around six quarters. There is a paucity of
studies understanding the behaviour of the volatility of major macroeconomic
variables and how the nature of the shocks have evolved in a time-varying
framework after the 1991 economic reforms. This study undertakes this task.
In this chapter, we use a Bayesian time-varying parameter structural VAR
with stochastic volatility following the works of Primiceri (2005), Canova and
Gambetti (2005), Gambetti, Pappa and Canova (2006) and Benati and Mum-
taz (2007) to understand the evolution of structural characteristics of the In-
dian economy in the post-reform period from 1991 to 2014. We use the Index
of industrial production, CPI inflation and call money rate to investigate the
nature of the volatility and the implication of the structural shocks. The
structural shocks that are constructed using sign restriction technique, display
different features at different points in time. One of the issues with Indian data
is availability of short time series. For understanding the volatility of variables
we have also used a univariate time-varying stochastic volatility model from
1970-2014. We could not use a TVP-VAR-SV framework before 1991 to un-
derstand about the evolution of volatility due to lack of interest rate data. We
examine the stochastic volatility of three macroeconomic variables, Industrial
output (IIP), CPI Inflation, and WPI Inflation.
The main results suggest considerable reduction in volatility from 1970s
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onwards in all the structural shocks and inflation variables. Indian macroeco-
nomic variables seem to exhibit time variation as can be noted through the
TVP-VAR-SV impulse response functions. Interestingly, for the period during
the East Asian crisis the volatility surge is much higher than observed during
the recent Global financial crisis. In terms of the stochastic volatility we find
that the period 2001 to 2006 seems to have the lowest volatility in the whole
sample and can be dubbed the short ‘Great Moderation’ period of India. We
observe that response of industrial output and CPI inflation are synchronous
to monetary policy response. In the univariate model also we find that CPI
inflation volatility fluctuations are more synchronous to CPI inflation than
WPI inflation. We also note that demand shocks rather seem to be persistent
than supply shocks during the period from 2007 to 2014. Estimated stochastic
volatility of the supply shocks is more than the demand shocks.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we provide the
description of the time-varying structural VAR model. Section 2.3 provides the
details of the estimation procedure of the time-varying structural VAR model.
Section 2.4 examines the empirical results and provides plausible inference of
the results. In the last section we conclude. Appendix A.1 has the details of
the estimation of the univariate stochastic volatility model.
2.2 The model
We work with the following time-varying parameters V AR(p) model:
Yt = ct + B0,t + B1,tYt−1+......+ Bp,tYt−p + υt (2.2.1)
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where V AR(υt) = Ωt and Yt = [yt, pit, rt], and yt is the annualized growth rate
of index of industrial production which has been taken as a proxy for output.pit
is the CPI inflation which is also transformed into annualized growth rate and
interest rate rt that we have used is the call money rate. The overall sample
period is from 1991m4 to 2014m12. The lag used for VAR is 4, which we have
taken according to Bayesian Information Criterion.
The covariance matrix of the error term υt, i.e., Ωt has time-varying elements.
Following Cogley and Sargent (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri
(2005) and Gambetti, Pappa and Canova (2006) we also assume that the time-
varying parameters are stacked in the vector θt. The time-varying parameters
are postulated to evolve as:
P (θt | θt−1,Q) = I(θt)F(θt | θt−1,Q) (2.2.2)
where I(θt) is the function rejecting unstable draws. In this way we can enforce
stationary constraint on the VAR with F(θt | θt−1,Q) evolving according to
the following law of motion:
θt = θt−1 + ηt (2.2.3)
where ηt∼ N(0,Q) and the reduced-form errors of the VAR in equation 2.1.1
are posited to be zero mean normally distributed. The covariance matrix of
the error terms have time-varying elements with the following structure:
12
V AR(υt) = Ωt = A−1t Ht(A−1t )
′ (2.2.4)
At is a lower triangular matrix with elements ai,j and Ht is a diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements hi,t. These time varying matrices Ht and At are defined
as:
Ht =

h1,t 0 0
0 h2,t 0
0 0 h3,t
 At =

1 0 0
a21,t 1 0
a31,t a32,t 1
 (2.2.5)
where hi,t evolves according to a geometric random walk:
ln hi,t = ln hi,t−1 + zt (2.2.6)
and non zero and non - unitary elements of matrix At are stacked in the vector
at = [a21,t, a31,t, a32,t], and these evolve as driftless random walk (Primiceri,
2005):
at = at−1 + τt (2.2.7)
and we also assume the vectors [υ′t, η
′
t, τ
′
t , z
′
t] to be distributed as:
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
υt
ηt
τt
zt

∼ N(0,V) (2.2.8)
where V =

Ωt 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 G

and G =

σ21 0 0
0 σ22 0
0 0 σ23
 (2.2.9)
As described in Primiceri (2005), there are two reasons for using a block di-
agonal structure for VT . First, for a heavily parameterised model like we are
using, block diagonal structure provides parsimony and second, it gives proper
structural interpretations of innovations. Using the relation Atυt = τt, where
V AR(τt) = St. For our VAR this implies:

1 0 0
a21,1 1 0
a31,1 a32,1 1


υ1,t
υ2,t
υ3,t
 =

τ1,t
τ2,t
τ3,t
 (2.2.10)
or in other way this can be written:
υ1,t = τ1,t
υ2,t = a21,tυ1,t + τ2,t
υ3,t = a31,tυ2,t + a32,tυ1,t + τ3,t
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where V AR(τ2,t) = h2t and V AR(τ3,t) = h3t
a21,t = a21,t−1 + τ1t (2.2.11)
a31,t
a32,t
 =
a31,t−1
a32,t−1
+
τ2t
τ3t
 (2.2.12)
V AR(τ1t) = S1 and
V AR(τ2t)
V AR(τ3t)
 = S2 (2.2.13)
This implies that the non-zero and non unitary elements of At which belong
to different rows will evolve independently. This structural VAR seems par-
ticularly useful for analysis of economies such as India which have undergone
various structural changes in the last 25 years because the magnitude of the
contemporaneous interrelations among the error terms in equation 2.1.1 are
flexible to change across time. This can also be corroborated by the different
monetary policy regimes with multiple targets and multiple instruments which
have been used in the last 25 years which is the period of the study. Another
advantage of using time varying SVAR is that it allows shifts in shock volatility
which are independent from the fluctuations seen in the coefficient θt.
2.3 Estimation
We estimate the above equations in the previous section using Bayesian es-
timations. For this we have to set up priors, which we describe next. Then
we simulate the posterior distribution of the hyper parameters and the states
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conditional on the data using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm
and after that we check for the convergence of the Markov Chain.
2.3.1 Priors
The first task is to set the initial values of the states θ0, a0 and h0 which we
assume as Normal and independent from one another and also independent
from the distributions of the hyper parameters. For calibrating the prior dis-
tributions for θ0, a0 and h0we first estimate a fixed coefficients VAR using a
training sample which in our case is around 5 years from 1991m4 to 1996m4.
So we set θ0:
θ0 ∼ N(θˆols, 12.Vˆ(θˆols) (2.3.1)
For the other two states a0 and h0 we proceed in the following manner. From
the fixed coefficient VAR, let Σˆols be the estimated covariance matrix of υt and
let C be the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Σˆols, where CC
′ = Σˆols. The
priors for the diagonal elements of the VAR covariance matrix are set as:
lnh0 ∼ N(lnµ0, 10× I3) (2.3.2)
Prior for the off - diagonal elements A0 are set:
a0 ∼ N(aˆols,V(aˆols) (2.3.3)
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where aˆols are off diagonal elements of Σˆols with each row scaled by corre-
sponding elements in the diagonal. The prior on Q is postulated as an Inverse
Wishart distribution:
Q0 ∼ IW(Q¯0,T0) (2.3.4)
where Q0 is set equal to Q0 = λ+Σˆols. The value of λ is set as 3.5×10−4(Cogley
and Sargent 2005). This prior is quite important as it influences the amount of
time variation allowed in the VAR model. The prior distribution of the block
of S is Inverse Wishart,
Si ∼ IW(S¯i, Ki), i = 1, 2. (2.3.5)
Si is calibrated using aˆols where we have S¯1 = 10−3 × [aˆ0,11] and S¯2 = 10−3 ×
diag([|aˆ0,21|, |aˆ0,31|].
For the variances of the stochastic volatility innovations, we assume an inverse
gamma distribution for the elements of G as suggested by Cogley and Sargent
(2002, 2005):
σ21 ∼ IG(
10−4
2 ,
1
2) (2.3.6)
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2.3.2 Posterior Simulations
Using MCMC algorithms, we simulate the posterior distributions of the hyper
parameters and states condition on data.
• Drawing θt: Conditional on AT ,HT and Y T , we draw θt using Carter
and Kohn (2004) algorithm.The posterior density can be factored as:
p(θT |Y T , AT , HT , V ) = p(θT |Y T , AT , HT , V )
T−1∏
t=1
p(θt|θt−1, Y T , AT , HT , V )
(2.3.7)
Conditional onAT ,HT and V , first elements on the right side p(θT |Y T , AT , HT , V ) =
N(θT ,PT ) is worked out with Kalman Filter, where PT is the precision matrix
of θT also calculated by Kalman Filter. Rest of the elements are computed us-
ing Backward Recursion algorithm as suggested by Cogley and Sargent (2005).
So with conditional normality of θt, we have:
θt|θt−1 + Pt|tP−1t+1|t(θt+1 − θt) (2.3.8)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP−1t+1|tPt|t (2.3.9)
which provides for each t from T−1 to 1, p(θt|θt+1,Y T ,AT ,HT , V ) = N(θt|θt+1,pt|t+1).
The backward recursion starts with a draw from N(θT ,pT ), let us denote as
θ¯T .
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We can get θT−1|T and PT−1|T conditional on θ¯T from equations 2.3.8 and 2.3.9.
This allows us to draw θ¯T−1 from N(θT−1, pT−1) and this goes on till t = 1.
• Drawing elements of at: Elements of at are drawn, conditional on Y T ,
θT and HT . The elements of at are drawn following Primiceri (2005). We
can write equation (2.2.1) as AtY˜t = At(Yt − X ′tθt) = Atυt = ut, with
V ar(ut) = Ht,namely:
Y˜2t = −a21,tY˜1t + u2,t (2.3.10)
Y˜3t = −a31,tY˜1t + u2,t −−a32,tY˜2t + u3,t (2.3.11)
And we have the identity Y˜1t = ui,1, where Y˜t=
[
Y˜1,t, Y˜2,1, Y˜3,t
]
. Based on
the observation equations (2.3.10) and (2.3.11), and the transition equation
(2.3.3), the elements of at can be drawn using the same algorithm we used for
drawing θt. The algorithm is seperately applied to the observation equations
(2.3.10) and (2.3.11).
• Drawing Ht: Conditional on Y T ,θTand AT , we can observe the orthog-
onal innovations, At(Yt − X ′tθt) = ut, where V AR(ut) = hi,t. We draw
hi,t by applying the Independence Metropolis Hasting algorithm for each
ut. Conditional on draw of hi,twe can draw gi from the Inverse Gamma
distribution.
gi ∼ IG
(ln.hi,t − ln.hi,t−1)′(ln.hi,t − ln.hi,t−1) + g0
2 ,
T + v0
2
 (2.3.12)
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• Drawing Hyper parameters: Conditional on Y T , θT , AT and HT , the
innovations to θt, ai,t and h′i.ts are known. This allows us to draw the
hyper parameters, basically the elements of Q, S1,, S2 and σ2i from their
respective distributions.
Now for simulating the posterior distribution of the different states and
hyper parameters (conditional on the data), we use MCMC algorithm by iter-
ating the above four steps. The posterior results are based on 200,000 draws
and after burn-in of 10,000 draws.
2.3.3 Identification
The structural analysis in the TVP-VAR-SV model is based on the identi-
fication of three shocks. The shocks are supply shocks, demand shocks and
monetary policy shocks. For identifying these shocks we use sign restrictions
as suggested in the work of Uhlig (2005) and Peersman (2005). Recent studies
using structural VAR have been more inclined to use sign restrictions for iden-
tifying the structural shocks of their models. Different identification strategies
have been found to be suitable for different scenarios. Sign restrictions have
been found to have a number of advantages as compared to structural shocks
identified by zero or long run restrictions. Contemporaneous sign restrictions
have this useful feature of allowing the model to be relatively agnostic from the
impact of structural shocks beyond the contemporaneous effects and it has also
been found to be consistent with many theoretical models (Peersman, 2005).
Sign restrictions is basically undertaken to calculate the structural impact ma-
trix, i.e., an A0 matrix from each retained draw of the covariance matrix, which
gets us an impulse response function produced from a particular shock with
its signs being set consistent with some theory.
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For undertaking this exercise, we use the algorithm of Ramirez, Waggoner,
and Zha (2010) which is an efficient algorithm for finding the structural impact
matrix consistent with the impulse responses of a certain sign consistent with
theory. The procedure works as follows:
• First we specify the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the VAR’s
covariance matrix Σ. This can be written as Σ = PDP ′ and we assume
A¯0 = PD
1
2 .
• Then we draw an N ×N matrix K from a N(0, 1) and after this we take
the QR decomposition of K.
• We computeQ and R such thatK = QR. Q is orthonormal, i.e.,QQ′ = I.
• We then compute the structural impact matrix A0 = A¯0×Q′ and keep the
A0 matrix which satisfies the sign restrictions provided for the particular
shock.
• This algorithm is repeated for each Gibbs iteration till we get around
100 structural impact matrices that satisfy the sign restrictions.
The variables included in the sign restrictions are index of industrial produc-
tion, consumer prices and average weighted call money rate. The sign restric-
tions are based on theoretical aggregate demand and supply frameworks which
are consistent with most structural models. The identification strategy follows
that of Peersman (2005), which is given in Table 2.1.
The sign restrictions identification strategy assumes that a positive aggre-
gate supply shock that has a positive impact on output is assumed to not to
result in an increase in consumer prices and nominal interest rates. A positive
aggregate demand shock has a positive impact on output and will not result
in a decrease in consumer prices and nominal interest rates. An expansionary
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Table 2.1: Sign Restrictions
Industrial Output (IIP) CPI Inflation Call Money Rate
Supply Shock ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Demand Shock ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Monetary Policy Shock ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0
monetary policy shock that increases the nominal interest rates is assumed to
not increase output and consumer prices.
For this study we have followed the procedure of keeping the A0 matrix
closest to the median of the estimated distribution of the A0 for each draw
from its VAR posterior.
2.4 Results
The data has been obtained from the Reserve Bank of India database and IFS
(IMF). We have used the index of industrial production as a proxy for output,
for inflation we have used two different measures, consumer price index (CPI)
and wholesale price index (WPI) inflation. Average weighted call money rate
has been used as the interest rate variable. Except for the call money rate, all
the data were deseasonalised using Census X-12 technique, and transformed
to annualized growth rates. For the univariate model, we have used quarterly
data from 1971Q2-2014Q4, and for the TVP-VAR-SV model, we have used
monthly data from 1991m4 to 2014m12.
2.4.1 Univariate and multivariate stochastic volatility
To attain a perspective on the stochastic volatility of macroeconomic variables
from a broader time period, we use a univariate time-varying stochastic volatil-
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ity model. Due to the unavailability of interest rate data before 1991, we could
not use the TVP-SVAR-SV model for the sample before 1991.
Figure 2.1(a) shows the stochastic volatility of the industrial output (IIP)
from 1973 onwards along with its long run mean. The period of highest volatil-
ity for industrial output is observed around 1988-89, a period just before the
balance of payment crisis in 1991. During this period, India had very high ex-
ternal borrowings along with massive public expenditure spending which some
consider to be the seed of the 1991 crisis (Panagariya, 2003). The second sharp
spurt occurred around 2009, during the recent financial crisis. It seems that
the ‘decoupling’ story of Indian economy to the financial crisis does not hold
while gauging at posterior median of the industrial output during this period.
Figure 2.1(b) exhibits the stochastic volatility for WPI (Wholesale Price
Index) inflation, which has been the headline inflation for India before the new
monetary policy framework of inflation targeting was introduced in January
2014 with CPI as its nominal anchor. Peak volatility in WPI inflation can
be seen from the initial data point 1973 to 1976, and then it slides gradually
before stabilizing around 1984. In the early 1970s we had the OPEC price
hikes which in turn had led to high inflation levels across the globe, which
seem to have percolated quite strongly also in India. India was susceptible to
high pass through of high oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s, as being a closed
economy with crude oil constituting the biggest chunk of its import basket the
impact was substantial. After the early 1990s reforms, after which the Indian
economy opened up, it was noted that changes in global commodities for a
wide range of goods influenced domestic inflation as compared to the 1970s
and 1980s when oil dominated (Mohanty, 2010).
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Figure 2.2(a) captures the stochastic volatility for CPI inflation. As ex-
pected the sharpest spike in volatility is observed in 1975, the peak of the
OPEC oil crisis, which as discussed earlier led to high inflation across the
world and in India. The Reserve Bank of India seems in a slight way vindi-
cated for introducing CPI as the headline inflation, because comparing CPI
with WPI, we find that CPI captures more events/crises and it synchronizes
closely with output fluctuations. Below we also find that monetary policy
shocks have similar impact on industrial output and CPI inflation. CPI shows
a bump unlike WPI in 1998-91, which as discussed above for industrial output
volatility, was the precursor of the balance of payment crisis in 1991. The
other much sharper spike is noticed around the period of the the East Asian
Crisis in 1997-98, where India seems to have been affected more as compared
to the recent ‘Great Recession’ of 2008.
Figure 2.3 shows the 16th and 84th percentiles of the standard deviation of
the structural shocks along with the posterior median. Stochastic volatility of
the supply shocks over the whole sample is more erratic compared to the other
two shocks. The highest surge in volatility for all the shocks can be observed
during the East Asian Crisis period. This result contradicts many studies
that had found India to be mostly insulated from the East Asian crisis during
1997 (Dua 2007). During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), we observe
that volatility of supply shocks is higher than other shocks but still lower than
observed during the East Asian crisis years. Monetary policy shocks have a
higher surge during 2006-07, compared to the GFC period, which could be due
to the high global inflation concern observed during 2006, due to the spiraling
of commodity and agricultural prices around the globe. Estimated stochastic
volatility of supply shocks is more than the demand shocks.
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2.4.2 Impulse response to structural shocks
Supply shocks: Figure 2.4 presents results of the time-varying impulse
response functions to a supply shock together with 16th and 84th percentiles of
the distribution, for whole sample from 1996m4-2014m12. 3-D surface charts
of the time-varying VAR helps us to show the impulse response to a supply
shock at each point in time. In our case, for a shock in the first month we get
the impulse response function for the variables for the whole year and with
the time varying construct for every year from 1996-2014. Time-variation can
be observed over the whole sample for CPI inflation and call money rate. Ac-
cording to the sign restrictions, we expect a positive supply shock to reduce
inflation and interest rates. In the Indian case, we find the direction of re-
sponse of CPI Inflation and call money rate to be overall consistent with sign
restrictions.
The sharp drop in CPI inflation due to the supply shock can be observed
during 2002-03. We detect for call money rate, sharp drops during the East
Asian Crisis period (1997), around 2000 and just before the GFC (2007). Gaug-
ing the response of the call money rate we note especially during 2006 and GFC
years a slight downward slide is observed after 8 months which persists until
the 25th month1. The high global and domestic inflation observed during 2006
must have warranted the higher interest rates. With regard to supply shock
1We also observe a slight rise in some years for call money rates before 2006. This
positive response of call money rate to supply shocks has been found in studies with time
invariant VAR models (Kalirajan and Singh). One reasonable argument which we have
discussed earlier for the high interest rates is the existence of tighter credit conditions and
low saving rates in India (Kalirajan and Singh, 2007). Tight credit conditions may exist
in India during this time period due to the overemphasis on exchange rate management.
Strong capital inflows coupled with capital controls make open market operation ineffective
in controlling exchange rate due to dominant effect of sterilization. So Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) used sterilization to control nominal appreciation and increased the interest rates for
stabilizing inflation, which in turn makes it difficult to establish which effect dominates
output.
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to industrial output (IIP), we do not find much time variation.
Figure 2.5 shows the persistence with regard to supply shocks. We note
persistence of CPI inflation to supply shocks especially during the early 2000
and during the global financial crisis period. In the case of call money rates,
we detect its persistence to supply shocks mostly during the 2006-08.
Demand shocks: Figure 2.6 presents time-varying impulse response func-
tions to a demand shock with 16th and 84th percentiles of the distribution, for
whole sample from 1996m4 - 2014m12. Time variation can be noted both for
the industrial growth and CPI inflation. For a one percent positive demand
shock, we can observe on average around 0.3 percent positive response of in-
dustrial growth (IIP). From the East Asian crisis period to 2003, we note that
IIP slides to the negative 0.1 percent for some months.
We note the sharpest spike in the call money rates in response to the
demand shocks during the East Asian crisis period, and the second biggest
spike can be noticed during 2006-07. During the global financial crisis period
from 2007 onwards we observe that the call money rates falling to the negative
region slightly in the 6th month and are persistently low till the 20th month.
This anomaly can be due to the crisis period asymmetry in the macroeconomy.
In figure 2.7, we can observe the persistence of the variables to the demand
shocks. From 2007 onwards, during the global financial crisis period, we note
industrial output(IIP) to be consistently persistent to demand shocks. Call
money rates are found to be persistent from 1996 to 2003.
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Monetary policy shocks: Figure 2.8 presents time varying impulse re-
sponse functions to a one percent monetary policy shock with 16th and 84th
percentiles of the distribution. We observe a sharp drop in industrial growth
(IIP) due to a positive monetary shock in 2004 and during the global financial
crisis years, 2008, 2011 and 2013. In the case of CPI inflation, we note sharp
drops also during the global financial crisis years, 2011 and 2013 and also a
slide can be observed during 2004-05. We notice that CPI inflation response
to monetary policy shocks are somewhat consistent with the industrial output.
This similar response in both the variables in terms of synchronous fluctua-
tions in volatility was also observed with the univariate stochastic volatility
model for both the variables. The only difference is in the magnitude of the
slide, with the sharpest drop for industrial output occurring in 2004 whereas
for CPI inflation it is noted during the global financial crisis period. In figure
2.9, we also observe the call money rate to be persistent to a monetary policy
shock during 2009, at the peak of the global financial crisis.
We can denote the years from 2001-2006 as the short ‘Great Moderation’
period of India. In terms of stochastic volatility we find that the period 2001
to 2006 seems to have the lowest volatility in the whole sample. First when
we examine the stochastic volatility of all the three variables in the univariate
model (figure 2.1, 2.2), we note that 2001-2006 has the least volatility. Next
when we observe the estimated stochastic volatility of the shocks (figure 2.3),
we observe the least volatility again during 2001-2006.
Figure 2.10 provides the mean of the retained MCMC draws for checking
the convergence of the time varying parameters. The means are calculated for
every 20 draws for θt, hi,t and aij,t. The recursive mean show convergence for
θt and aij,t, but the parameter of stochastic volatility hi,t seems not to have
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converged properly with inconsistent fluctuations.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the time varying evolution of structural shocks
and stochastic volatility for India in the the post-reform period. We used a
Bayesian time varying parameter structural VAR with stochastic volatility and
identified three structural shocks namely supply shocks, demand shocks and
monetary policy shocks using the identification strategy of sign restrictions.
For examining the stochastic volatility of the major macroeconomic variables,
we used three macroeconomic variables, Industrial output(IIP), CPI Inflation,
and WPI Inflation. The main results can be summarized as follows,
Time variation is an important feature of the major macroeconomic vari-
ables in India. During the post-reform period 1991 onwards, we detect sharp
reduction in estimated stochastic volatility for all shocks and variables. Inter-
estingly, during the East Asian crisis the volatility surge is much higher than
observed during the recent global financial crisis. We find that CPI inflation
response to monetary policy shocks are more consistent with industrial output.
This similar response in both the variables in terms of synchronous fluctua-
tions in volatility was also observed with the univariate stochastic volatility
model for both the variables. We also observe that demand shocks seem to be
persistent unlike supply shocks during the period from 2007-14.
A.1 Appendix
Univariate Stochastic Model Estimation
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The model can written as:
Yt=ct + btYt−1 + εt
√
exp(lnht) (2.5.1)
The coefficients evolve as:
Bt = Bt−1 + et where B = {c, b}, et ∼ N(0, Q) (2.5.2)
Variance of the error term ht evolves as:
lnht = lnht−1 + υt where υt ∼ N(0, g) (2.5.3)
The above model is estimated by combining the Carter and Kohn Algorithm
with Metropolis algorithm.
• Step 1: Start with a setting an Inverse Wishart prior forQ.Q ∼ IW (Q0, T0).
Prior scale matrix is constructed as Q0 = k ×Qols × T0. k is the scaling
factor, Qols is the variance covariance matrix of B and T0 is the length
of the training sample. We get a starting value for ht as, then set the
priors for µ¯ and σ¯. Then we set p(g) ∼ IG(g0, υ0) and set starting value
for g and Q.
• Step 2: Sample initial values of htfrom log normal density conditional on
g and Bt,
f(h0
h1
) = h−10 exp
−(ln.h0 − µ0)2
2σ0
 (2.5.4)
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Draw a new value of ht from the candidate density:
q(ΦG+1) = h−1t exp(
−(ln.h0 − µ)2
2σh
(2.5.5)
where µ = ln.ht+1+ln.ht−12 , σh =
g
2 . Then we compute the acceptance prob-
ability:
α = min
h−0.5t,new.exp
( −εt
2ht,new
)
h−0.5t,old.exp
( −εt
2ht,old
) , 1
 (2.5.6)
Draw u ∼ U(0, 1). If u < α then set ht = ht,new.
• Step 3: Given ht, compute υt = lnht−lnht−1.Then draw g, g ∼ IG
υ′tυt+g0
2 ,
T+υ0
2

which is Metropolis plus Gibbs.
• Step 4: Conditional on ht and Q sample Bt using the Carter and Kohn
algorithm. This is then incorporated into the Kalman Filter.
• Step 5: Sample Q ∼ IW ([(Bt −Bt−1)′(B −Bt−1) +Q0],T0 + T )
• Step 6: Repeat steps 2 to 5M times. After burn-in the last draws of ht, g,
Bt and Q gives an approximation to the marginal posterior distribution.
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Figure 2.1: Univariate Stochastic Volatility of industrial output and WPI in-
flation
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Figure 2.2: Univariate Stochastic Volatility of CPI inflation
(a) CPI Inflation
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Figure 2.3: Posterior Median, 16th and 84th percentile of the standard devia-
tion of the structural shocks
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Figure 2.4: Time-varying median impulse response functions to a supply shock
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Figure 2.5: Persistence with supply shocks
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Figure 2.6: Time-varying median impulse response functions to a demand
shock
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Figure 2.7: Persistence with demand shocks
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Figure 2.8: Time-varying median impulse response functions to a monetary
policy shock
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Figure 2.9: Persistence with monetary policy shocks
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Figure 2.10: Convergence: Recursive Mean for VAR parameters
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Chapter 3
Implicit central bank targets:
nominal GDP and the Great
Moderation
3.1 Introduction
Anchoring inflation expectations has come to be widely accepted goal of mon-
etary policy (Woodford 2003). This strong preference for stabilization of in-
flation expectation started during Paul Volcker’s tenure as the US Federal
Reserve chairman. He has been credited for starting the ‘hawkish’ era of cen-
tral banking in US, with strong monetary policy reaction towards fluctuations
in inflation. The supporters of this hypothesis argue that the economic fluc-
tuations that the US encountered in the 1960s and 1970s, was the result of
lack of focus of the Federal Reserve towards inflation stabilization. One of the
arguments put forward for the ‘dovish’ monetary policy of the 1970s, was that
there seemed to exist a long run permanent tradeoff between the level of unem-
ployment and inflation, which was dismissed in the 1980s due to high inflation
rates observed and also further economic research convinced that such a long
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run tradeoff may not really exist (Sargent 1999).
Paul Volcker during his tenure as the Federal Reserve chairman, made
his priority of stabilizing inflation expectations as the major objective of the
Federal Reserve and his legacy of stabilizing inflation expectations endured in
successive regimes. Paul Volcker was not interested in whether inflation surged
due to demand side or supply side factors. Even during the brief but rather
unsuccessful experiment of introducing monetary targeting, his main objective
was to influence inflation expectations (Hetzel 2004). The conventional view
is that inflation expectations can be stabilized by targeting inflation.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Stock and Watson (2002) and Bernanke
(2004) have argued that post-Volcker or during the ‘Great Moderation’ period,
the monetary policy preferences of the Federal Reserve were much more sen-
sitive and tuned to changes in expected inflation and overwhelmingly found
inflation to be the prefered policy target of the Federal Reserve1. This is
also substantiated by the proponents of inflation targeting (Bernanke (2004),
Svensson (2007)) who argue that stabilizing inflation should be the single most
important objective of the central bank. Monetary policy rules such as the
Taylor rule (2003) embody such an hypothesis. This study counters this hy-
pothesis, and shows that for accomplishing its objective of stabilizing inflation
expectations during Great Moderation, the Federal Reserve was instead im-
plicitly targeting nominal GDP.
1The ‘Great Moderation’ has been considered as a period of reduction in macroeconomic
volatility in the US spanning from 1984-2007 (Stock and Watson (2002), Bernanke (2004)).
Many factors have been attributed for the decline in macroeconomic volatility including in-
ventory dynamics (McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2007)), smaller macroeconomic shocks (Stock
and Watson (2002)) and stronger preference for low inflation in the monetary policy pro-
cess (Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Bernanke (2004)). Stabilizing inflation expectations
through the monetary policy process has been argued as one of the prominent factors re-
sponsible for the Great Moderation
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Nominal GDP has not been used as an explicit target by the Federal
Reserve, but gauging the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meetings during Paul Volcker’s era, it seems that nominal GNP was
used as an intermediate target2. Alan Greenspan in 1992 came much closer in
arguing that Federal Reserve should target NGDP growth of 4.5%3
Let me put it to you this way. If you ask whether we are confirm-
ing our view to contain the success that we’ve had to date on inflation,
the answer is “yes.” I think that policy is implicit among the members
of this Committee, and the specific instruments that we may be using
or not using are really a quite secondary question. As I read it, there
is no debate within this Committee to abandon our view that a non-
inflationary environment is best for this country over the longer term.
Everything else, once we’ve said that, becomes technical questions. I
would say in that context that on the basis of the studies, we have seen
that to drive nominal GDP, let’s assume at 4-1/2 percent, in our old
philosophy we would have said that [requires] a 4-1/2 percent growth in
M2. In today’s analysis, we would say it’s significantly less than that.
I’m basically arguing that we are really in a sense using [unintelligible]
a nominal GDP goal of which the money supply relationships are tech-
nical mechanisms to achieve that. And I don’t see any change in our
view. . . and we will know they are convinced (about “price stability”)
when we see the 30-year Treasury at 5-1/2 percent.
The above Greenspan quote can be somewhat substantiated if we look at
2From the FOMCminutes 1982 December (20), Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President
Frank Morris says, ‘‘I think we need a proxy – an independent intermediate target – for
nominal GNP, or the closest thing we can come to as a proxy for nominal GNP, because
that’s what the name of the game is supposed to be’’.
3Market Monetarist blog - “When US 30-year yields hit 5% the Great Recession will be
over” 28th May 2013.
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figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b). Figure 3.1(a) shows the inflation gap4 with the
federal funds rate, whereas in figure 3.1(b) we have the nominal GDP gap5
and the federal funds rate.
From 1989-1992, we can observe that the inflation gap increases (figure
3.1(a)). When the inflation gap increases on the positive side, we expect the
central bank to try to reduce the gap by using contractionary monetary policy
by raising the interest rates in an inflation targeting regime. But here we find
that the Federal Reserve just did the opposite. But observing the NGDP gap
during 1989-1992, the gap is approaching zero and in the negative region, and
we would expect in an NGDP targeting regime for an expansionary monetary
policy and the Federal Reserve is indeed using an expansionary policy. Another
anomaly with regard to inflation can be found from mid-1996 to mid-1999
where we find that the inflation gap becomes negative sharply but not much
movement is observed in the federal funds rate. In the case of the NGDP gap,
its interaction with federal funds rate is quite synchronous till 2007.
4For inflation we have used the GDP deflator. The inflation gap has been constructed
by differencing GDP deflator from its trend, which has been constructed from a Hodrick-
Prescott filter. The smoothing parameter λ = 1600, as we have used quarterly data.
5Nominal GDP gap has been constructed by differencing nominal GDP from its trend
which has been constructed from a Hodrick-Prescott filter
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Figure 3.1: Inflation Gap and NGDP Gap
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Influential monetary policy rules such as the Taylor rule (1993) and the
Henderson-McKibbin rule (1993) were formulated as an exercise to depict the
behaviour of the preferences of the Federal Reserve in the US. The Taylor
rule (1993) has become a standard benchmark analysis for monetary policy in
US and elsewhere, with several studies corroborating that indeed the Federal
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Reserve has been closely following the Taylor rule (Clarida Gali and Gertler,
2000; Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000). The original Taylor rule (1993) showed
that the monetary policy process in the US can be described in terms of short
term interest rates which stabilize two operational variables, inflation and the
output gap, with more weightage given to inflation. The logic underlying
the Taylor rule is that the Federal Reserve responds to increases in inflation
by raising the interest rates more than one-for-one, which can eliminate self-
fulfilling expectations and hence reduce economic fluctuations, which in turn
stabilizes inflation expectations. But the Taylor rule in a series of studies has
been criticized due to ‘operational’ problems for policy purposes. 6
NGDP targeting has an operational advantage as there is no requirement
for having an output gap measurement. Output gap has been a controversial
‘operational’ variable for the central banks as it has complications regarding
modeling potential output and its measurement. Orphanides (2001) found
that measurement error in output gap contributed to the excessive inflation in
the 1970s. He also argued that a monetary policy based on real time output
gap can deviate much more than the desired policy. Studies have shown that
this uncertainty in output gap can be quite risky for the monetary policy
process and thus less weight should be given to output gap (Smets, 2002;
Rudebusch, 2002).There are also studies that have argued that even if output
gap is measured perfectly by the central bank, strong responses to the output
gap can be destabilizing by raising the probability of indeterminacy7 (Coibion
6The criticism related to the operational issue of the Taylor rule was related to infor-
mational, data timing and measurement problems especially for real variable such as the
output gap. If policymakers were going to use the original Taylor rule, then they would re-
quire information about unreliable indicators’ such as natural rate of interest and potential
output, which studies have shown are not reliable (Laubach, 2001; Laubach and Williams,
2001; Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2001; Orphanides and Van Norden, 2002; Van Norden,
2002; Orphanides, 2003).
7Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) - “We find that if the post-1982 Fed had responded as
strongly to the output gap as it did before Volcker, then the likelihood of the US economy’s
being in the indeterminacy region would be somewhat higher, particularly at higher rates
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and Gorodnichenko, 2011).
Table 3.6 provides coefficients for the output gap in various Taylor rule
estimations. In Orphanides (2003) observing the estimation results of the
Taylor rule with real time output gap data, the coefficient estimates in the
period 1982-1997 is just 0.10 and in earlier periods also the coefficients are less
than 0.20. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) using real time data from FOMC
staff meeting found somewhat bigger coefficient estimates for the output gap
around 0.44 during the Post-Volcker or the Great Moderation period. But still
the estimates are not that large. There seems to be less preference for the
output gap given by the Federal Reserve.
Optimal nominal GDP targeting has been found to be superior to infla-
tion targeting frameworks such as the Taylor rule (Jenson 2002). It has been
found to be more efficient especially when the economy is hit by a cost push
shock, supply shocks or shocks to country risk (Henderson and McKibbin,
1993; Jensen, 2002). NGDP targeting accommodates the two important com-
ponents that central banks are most concerned about, inflation and output.
Nominal GDP can also serve as long run anchor of monetary policy and this
takes care of the concern that monetary policy cannot influence the real output
in the long run (Rudebusch, 2000).
This chapter examines the monetary policy preferences of the Federal Re-
serve for the period 1960-2007. The main contribution of this chapter is to
show that during the Great Moderation period, the US Federal Reserve was
stabilizing inflation expectations, by implicitly targeting nominal GDP. This
is shown by estimating different variants of nominal GDP rules, which then
of inflation.”
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are compared with Taylor rules using both ex-post revised data and real time
briefing forecasts of FOMC. With ex-post revised data, which includes also the
Volcker period along with the Great Moderation period (1979Q4 - 2006Q4),
we find stronger preference to the nominal GDP variable as compared to the
inflation in the Taylor rule. This stronger preference is again found in the two
different sets of real time data (Greenbooks forecasts and briefing forecasts
from FOMC meetings).
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section 3.2 we derive the forward
looking nominal GDP rule that will be used for estimation purposes. Section
3.3.1 provides the estimation results with ex-post revised data comparing the
performances of the nominal GDP rule to the Taylor rule. In section 3.3.2 we
provide our estimation results with real time data comparing the performance
of nominal GDP rule to the Taylor rule. In section 3.4, identification issue in
the NGDP rule. In section 3.5, we provide model comparisons and also provide
some robustness analysis. And in section 3.6 we conclude.
3.2 Forward Looking Nominal GDP Rule
In this section we derive a forward-looking nominal GDP rule that will be
used for estimation. Monetary policy rules such as the Taylor rule, were origi-
nally formulated with the federal funds rate reacting to contemporaneous data
of inflation and the output gap (Taylor, 1993). There has been criticism re-
garding the use of contemporaneous data in formulating monetary policy rules,
as it can be non-operational due to the uncertainly involving getting realized
data such as real GDP even at the end of the quarter (McCallum and Nel-
son, 1998). This issue was rectified by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) when
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they proposed a forward-looking Taylor rule, in which the respective central
banks respond to deviations of the expected variables from their respective
targets. Thus monetary policy functions have been derived taking into consid-
eration such that the current monetary policy reacts to future expected values
of macroeconomic targets.
Below we specify a forward looking nominal GDP8 rule. The nominal
GDP rule has been specified by first taking a baseline rule. The baseline rule
constitutes of a target monetary policy rate. The target rate is a function of
the deviation of future nominal GDP from period t to period t+k, EtYt,k from
Federal Reserve supposed target, Y ∗.
The target model’s baseline equation is:
r∗ = rr∗ + β(E | Yt,k | Ωt)− Y ∗) (3.2.1)
In the above equation (3.2.1), rr∗denotes the desired interest rate when
the nominal GDP is at its target level. Yt,k denotes the quarter-to-quarter
annualized percent change in nominal GDP between period t and t + k. E is
the expectation operator and Ωt is the information set. This sort of forward
8Nominal GDP targeting was suggested as a probable monetary policy regime in the
late 1970s. The studies suggested that nominal GDP targeting would be better than other
monetary policy regime in stabilizing output and employment (Meade, 1978; Tobin, 1980;
Corden, 1981; and McCallum, 1985). Nominal GDP targeting can work by the following
process where the objective of the Central bank is to reduce the loss function given as,
Lt+j = (xt − xt−1 + pit − (4x+ pi)∗)2,
where xt is the nominal GDP rate and pit is the inflation rate. Here the loss function is an
increasing function of the deviations of the nominal GDP growth from the target (4x+pi)∗.
The central bank would not raise the interest rate as long as the nominal GDP remains
below a deterministic target path which would be equal to the long average growth rate of
real output and target inflation rate thus keeping stabilizing inflation and also diminishing
fluctuations in real cyclical aggregates (McCallum and Nelson, 1999).
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looking rule has the advantage that the central bank does not require exact
information about the current values of its operational variables.
Consistent with earlier studies, we assume that there is some sort of inter-
est rate smoothing by the Federal Reserve (Clarida et al 2000). Studies have
shown that policy gradualism helps in the process of convergence to rational
expectations equilibrium (Clarida et al, 2000; Bullard and Mitra, 2002; Wood-
ford, 2003). We incorporate partial adjustment of the actual federal funds rate
to the target level.
rt = ρ(L)rt−1 + (1− ρ)r∗t (3.2.2)
where,
ρ(L) = ρ1 + ρ2L+ ...ρpLp
ρ = ∑p1=1 ρi
rt−i = Lirt
Equation (3.2.2) describes the partial adjustment mechanism of the interest
rate of the central bank to its target rate r∗t . Each period the central bank tries
to eliminate a fraction (1−ρ) of the gap between the current level and the linear
combination of its past values.9 For obtaining the policy reaction function we
combine the baseline equation (3.2.1) with the partial adjustment equation
(3.2.2):
9ρ denotes the degree of smoothing of interest rate changes.
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rt = (1− ρ)[rr∗ + βYt,k] + ρ(L)rt−1 + εt (3.2.3)
where, εt = −(1− ρ){β(Yt,k − E[Yt,k | Ωt]
The error term εt is a linear combination of the forecast errors and is thus
orthogonal to any variable in the information set Ωt. For estimation purposes
let us consider a vector of variables Zt known when policy rates are set. This
implies through equation (3.2.3) that we have a set of orthogonality condi-
tions:
E(ε1tZt) = 0 (3.2.4)
The above condition can be used thus to estimate the parameter vectors us-
ing Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) [Hansen (1982)]. To estimate the
expectations process, it can be assumed that the Federal Reserve has rational
expectations which means in a sense there exists a set of moment conditions
and hence Generalized Method of Moments can be used for estimation (Clar-
ida, Gali and Gertler, 2000; Favero, 2009). Instrument variable approach has
the advantage that if the orthogonality condition of the instruments and model
errors are valid, then parameter estimation can be valid under quite general
assumptions about the serial correlation of the variables and it is not required
to be specific. In the GMM procedure an optimal weighting matrix is used
that accounts for serial correlation in the error term.
For real time data, we define α = rr∗and we can rewrite equation (3.2.3) as:
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rt = (1− ρ)[α + βYt,k] + ρ(L)rt−1 + εt (3.2.5)
We proxy the unobserved forecasts of nominal GDP by the Greenbook forecasts
which were released in t+ n, so we can rewrite (3.2.5) as:
rt = (1− ρ)[α + βYt+n | Ωt+n] + ρ(L)rt−1 + υt (3.2.6)
And the forecast errors are defined in (3.2.7) where they are subsumed into
error term υt.
E{Yt+n | Ωt+n} − E{Yt+n | Ωt} =
n∑
i=1
ξt+1 (3.2.7)
The estimates are robust and valid only if forecast errors are unbiased and
serially uncorrelated. Due to less time span between real time data and the
first estimates, the unbiasedness and serial correlation is much weaker than
white noise forecast error with respect to ex-post revised data (Gerberding,
Seitz and Worms, 2005; Kozicki and Tinsley, 2009).
E{Yt+n | Ωt} − E{Yt+n | Ωt} =
n∑
i=1
ξt (3.2.8)
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3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Estimation results using ex-post revised data
In this section results are provided of estimation of the monetary policy reac-
tion function defined by equation (3.2.3). The data are of quarterly frequency
and taken from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED.
The interest rate that is used is the effective Federal Funds rate. The results
show that there exists a significant relationship between the federal funds rate
and nominal GDP.
Table 3.1: Comparing the rules with ex-post revised data
NGDP Rule
Estimation sample βngdp ρ
1960Q3- 1979Q2 0.79 0.86
(0.14) (0.02)
1979Q3 - 2006Q4 3.72 0.90
(0.91) (0.02)
Taylor Rule
Estimation sample β γ ρ
1960Q3- 1979Q2 0.83 0.48 0.64
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
1979Q3 - 2006Q4 2.32 0.79 0.83
(0.39) (0.26) (0.04)
NGDP Rule: rt = (1−∑pi=1 ρi)(α + βYt,k) +∑pi=1 ρirt−i + εt,i
Taylor Rule: rt = (1−∑pi=1 ρi)(α + βpit,k + γt,q) +∑pi=1 ρirt−i + εt,i
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In table 3.1, the results reported are based on estimation using the Gener-
alised Method of Moments. Instruments used for estimation are growth rate
of nominal GDP, M2 growth rate, term structure spread (10 year Government
Security - 3 month Treasury Bill) and growth rate of commodity price index.
Quarterly data was used so the instruments consist of four lags each. Nominal
GDP coefficient is βngdp and ρ is the coefficient of the interest rate smoothing
term. The Taylor rule in table 3.1 is based on the estimation results from
Consolo and Favero (2009)10. The policy reaction function that is estimated
in Favero (2009) is the following:
rt = (1−
p∑
i=1
ρi)(α + βpit,k + γt,q) +
p∑
i=1
ρirt−i + εt,i (3.3.1)
For comparability both the rules have estimation results with the same set
of time periods11. As in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), the first period of the
sample has been divided into 1960Q3-1979Q2, and the second is from 1979Q4-
2006Q4 for estimation purposes. As in the literature, we call the first period as
the pre-Volcker era (1960Q3-1979Q2), and the second is a combination of the
Volcker era and the Great Moderation period (1979Q4-2006Q4). Both models
are not rejected at any conventional significance levels and are significant in
most of the cases. First gauging at the pre-Volcker era (1960Q3-1979Q2), we
note that both the coefficients of the Taylor and NGDP rules are less than
10pit the annualized inflation quarterly inflation rate of the GDP chain weighted price
index, xt the output gap and rt the effective federal funds rate. The sets of instruments are
lags of inflation rate, the output gap, the M2 growth rate, the term structure spread and
growth rate of the commodity price index.
11This period consists the tenures of William Martin, Arthur Burns and William Miller
as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Whereas the second period encompasses the tenure of
Volcker and Greenspan, considered the era of stability and moderation in the macroeconomic
literature.
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unity. Comparing the estimates in both the models we find that coefficient of
inflation in the Taylor rule (0.83) is slightly more preferred than the coefficient
of nominal GDP (0.79) in the nominal GDP rule.
In the second sample period (1979Q4-2006Q4), we find that the results are
completely the opposite with coefficient of nominal GDP (3.72) being more
than that of inflation (2.32). With ex-post revised data, our model shows
that the US Federal Reserve in the Great Moderation period seemed to have
an implicit preference for nominal GDP as compared to inflation, contrary to
which is reported in most of the macroeconomic literature.
So the main conclusion that comes from the estimation results of the ex-
post revised data is that inflation is the more preferred variable of the US
Federal Reserve during 1960-79 but from 1979 to 2006, nominal GDP seems
to be the variable implicitly preferred by the US Federal Reserve.
3.3.2 Estimation Results using Real Time Data
Analysis with real time data, especially for historical evaluation of the
monetary policy process, is considered more efficient as it has been observed
that ex-post revised data does not provide the real information of what policy
makers may know and sometimes this discrepancy may be large. Orphanides
(2001) found that the Taylor rule provides a good description of monetary
policy when ex-post revised data is used but with real time data the scenario
does not seem to be that perfect. Basically, he found that the better fit of the
Taylor rule was questionable when estimated using real time data.
Orphanides (2001) notes that “Interpretation of historical policy based on
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revised data instead of the data available to policy makers when policy deci-
sions were made appears to be of questionable value. Estimated policy reaction
functions obtained using the ex post revised data yield misleading descriptions
of historical policy. The presence of noise results in biased estimates and po-
tentially obscures the appropriate specification of the policy reaction function.
Needless to say, identification of monetary policy shocks under such circum-
stances becomes a haphazard enterprise”. In another study, Rudebusch (1998)
using real time data found the optimal coefficients in the Taylor rule that he
estimated were much bigger than the original one estimated by John Taylor.
Real time data for the study has been obtained from the Federal Reserve
of Philadelphia from its Greenbook forecasts12. Romer and Romer (1996)
observed that Greenbook forecasts were better forecasts than any other private
forecasts13.
Greenbook forecasts have this good feature that rational expectations does
not require to be imposed on the central bank to estimate the policy reac-
tion function. Greenbook forecasts has been used as a proxy for the Fed’s
expectations (Orphanides 2002; 2003). The monetary policy reaction function
can be estimated using Least Squares as long as the orthogonality condition
is satisfied, which basically means that current forecasts are uncorrelated with
monetary policy shocks. This basically means that in a given period, the
12It might be argued that as these forecasts are prepared by the staff at the Federal
Reserve so it might be argued that it may not provide a truly objective view and might
have forecasts endogenous to policy assumptions. But as Kozicki and Tinsley (2009) have
argued, that for short term projections such endogeniety may not matter.
13They noted that, “information the Federal Reserve has about the economy that is not
known to market participants is likely to be reflected in the Federal Reserve’s internal fore-
casts. Because the Federal Reserve makes its forecasts public only after five years, the
forecasts can contain information that is not known contemporaneously to market partici-
pants...We also find that the Federal Reserve possesses equally important private information
about the path of future output. Thus our results provide powerful evidence that the Federal
Reserve has important information about the path of the economy beyond that available to
market participants.”
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changes in the policy settings prescribed by the rule has no relation to the
forecasts. This case can be argued for Greenbook forecasts as the actual de-
cision taken during the FOMC meeting is independent of the forecasts that is
prepared by the staff before the meeting (Boivin 2006).
For estimation purposes we have utilized two different types of real time
data sets. Firstly, we have taken the quarterly data directly provided in the
Federal Reserve of Philadelphia and then we have extracted Greenbook fore-
casts from individual FOMC meetings which range from 6-12 data points in
a year, as shown in Orphanides (2003; 2004) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011). We utilize the data from 1969 to 2006 and divide into different samples
based on estimation of various monetary policy rules.
Table 3.2 provides the estimation results comparing the contemporaneous
nominal GDP rule and the Taylor rule. In the contemporaneous rule, we use
the Greenbook forecast values for the current quarter. We also provide point
estimates, standard errors, which are in parenthesis and selected statistics
provide information regarding the fit of the models.
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Table 3.2: Real time data from FOMC staff meetings
Nominal GDP Rule Taylor Rule
Parameters 1969-1979 1983-2006 1983-2006
β 0.38 2.01 β 1.96
(1.25) (0.707) (0.51)
ρ 0.98 0.94 ρ 0.98
(0.033) (0.019) (0.013)
φ 0.571
(0.59)
R2 0.94 0.98 R2 0.98
s.e.e. 0.50 0.33 s.e.e. 0.341
AIC 1.49 0.67 AIC 0.70
BIC 1.56 0.72 BIC 0.75
Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors & Covariance with (lag truncation=4)
Based on quarterly data of the Greenbook forecasts from the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia.
For estimation with real time data, we are considering just the Great Mod-
eration period which is relevant for the central analysis. Considering the Great
Moderation period from 1983-2006, we find that the coefficient of inflation
(1.96) which is the main target variable in the Taylor rule is less than the
main target variable (i.e., nominal GDP (2.01)) in the NGDP rule. It might
be argued that the difference is not that much and especially the R2 are the
same. But if we observe the Information Criterions for comparing which model
has the better fit, we find that the NGDP rule has the better fit with lesser
AIC and BIC than does the Taylor rule. Thus from real time data estimation
also, we find that federal funds rate responds more to nominal GDP than in-
flation, or in other words, nominal GDP was more implicitly preferred variable
by the Federal Reserve during the Great Moderation.
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3.4 Identification issue in the nominal GDP
rule
As nominal GDP growth is a summation of real GDP growth and pro-
ducer\price inflation, there may be an identification issue that needs to be
resolved. It can be argued that one variable, say inflation, has been driving the
growth and the composite NGDP rule may be providing a misleading picture
to policymakers. One way of resolving this issue is to put inflation, nominal
GDP and the output gap in a single rule and check whether the coefficients
are significant and have reasonable values.
For resolving this issue we estimate two monetary policy rules. Rule 1 that
we take is a Generalized Taylor rule (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011) which
has CPI inflation, real GDP growth and output gap as the main variables14.
The second rule is a modified generalized Taylor rule also with nominal GDP.15
• Rule 1: Generalized Taylor rule with real GDP:
rt = c+ (1− ρ1 − ρ2)(φpiEtpit+j + φyEtYt+j + φxEtxt+j) + ρ1rt−1 + ρ2rt−2 + εt)
(3.4.1)
• Rule 2: Generalised Taylor rule with nominal GDP:
rt = (1− ρ1)(φpiEtpit+j + φyEtNYt+j + φxEtxt+j) + ρ1rt−1 + εt) (3.4.2)
14In Rule 1, rt is the target federal funds rate set, pit is the rate of change of the output
deflator and xt is the output gap is based on Greenbook forecasts as found in Orphanides
(2003 ; 2004). Rule 1 is estimated for a period from 1983-2002
15In Rule 2, NYt is the nominal GDP, where the data for nominal GDP has been taken
from Greenbook forecasts from the FOMC meetings which have somewhat varied frequencies
but post 1982 there were six FOMC meetings so we get six data points in a year. xt is the
output gap which are also based on Orphanides (2003; 2004). Rule 2 is estimated for a
period from 1983-2006.
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Both rules have been found to be significant and as shown in table 3.3, the
standard errors are also reasonable. In both the monetary policy rules we find
that the coefficients of the real variables, nominal GDP and real GDP have
values larger than the coefficient for inflation. Observing at Rule 1, we note
that real GDP has a larger coefficient than inflation, whereas output gap seems
to be the least preferred. Observing Rule 2, we find that nominal GDP has
bigger magnitude of its coefficient and can be inferred to be more preferred
variable than inflation, whereas output gap is the least preferred variable.
Table 3.3: Identification Issue
Rule 1 Rule 2
1983-2002 1983-2006
φpi 1.58 φpi 1.01
(0.51) (0.44)
φy 2.21 φny 1.58
(0.82) (0.36)
φx 0.44 φx 0.50
(0.16) (0.13)
Table 3.4: NGDP rule with output gap
1983-2007
σ 0.94
(0.01)
β 2.55
(0.60)
λ 0.69
(0.19)
R2 0.98
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In both the rules, the coefficient of inflation is less than the coefficient
for the main real (output) variables showing the preference for output than
inflation in the post-Volcker era or during the Great Moderation period. The
output gap is the least preferred in both the monetary rules in confirmation
with the standard results in the literature.
We also estimate a nominal GDP rule with an output gap (table 3.4), rt =
ρrt−1 + (1 − ρ)(α + βENYt+k + φExt+j + εt), We find that the magnitude of
the output gap is just 0.69 compared to nominal GDP which is 2.55.
3.5 Model Comparison and Robustness Anal-
ysis
We can compare two different rules or models by the fit of both the models.
Figures 3.2 (a) and 3.2 (b) provides the provides the actual Federal Funds rate
(FFR) fitted with predictions of the nominal GDP rule, and figure 3.3 shows
actual FFR fitted with predictions of the Taylor rule.
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Figure 3.2: FFR and Predictions of the NGDP rule (1984-2007)
(a) 1984-1998
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(b) 1998-2007
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Figure 3.3: FFR and Predictions of Taylor rule (1988-2006)
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Observing the figures we can note that during the Great Moderation period,
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the fit with predicted nominal GDP rule matches the actual FFR better than
the Taylor rule.
Table 4 provides the model comparison for both the rules with the rules
estimated for different time horizons (t = 0, 1, 2).16 The estimation is again
based on real time data from the Greenbook forecasts of the Federal Reserve
of Philadelphia. As can be seen in table 3.4, for model comparison and for
comparing the fit of the models we have provided the respective R2, Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information criterion (BIC). Both
the rules have been estimated for the period from 1983-2006. As we know
the lesser the value of the information criterion the better is the fit. Table 4
shows that AIC and BIC values for the nominal GDP rule is much smaller
than the corresponding values for the Taylor rule, showing clearly that the
nominal GDP rule has a better fit than the Taylor rule.
Table 3.5 shows the relevant nominal GDP rule (t− 1, t, t+ 1,t+ 2) which
can be used for policy purposes. We can note from the table that a forward
looking nominal GDP rule with horizon t+ 1) has the largest coefficient which
has been used for estimations. Thus the forward looking NGDP rule of the
form rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(α + βEtYt+1) is the most relevant rule.
3.6 Conclusion
Stabilization of inflation expectations by implicitly or explicitly targeting in-
flation has been argued as one of the major factors that contributed for the
Great Moderation in the US. This study counters this view, and shows that
for accomplishing its objective of stabilizing inflation expectations, the Federal
16Following rules have been estimated. For Nominal GDP rule: rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(α+
βEtYt+k and for Taylor rule rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(α+ βEtpit+k + φEtxt+j)
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Reserve was instead implicitly targeting nominal GDP. This claim has been
corroborated by estimating different variants of nominal GDP rules and com-
pared with Taylor rules using both ex-post revised data and real time briefing
forecasts of FOMC.
With ex-post revised data, which includes also the Volcker period along
with the Great Moderation period (1979Q4-2006Q4) we find a stronger pref-
erence for nominal GDP variable as compared to the inflation in the Taylor
rule. This stronger preference is again found in the two different sets of real
time data (Greenbooks forecasts and briefing forecasts from FOMC meetings).
We have also illustrated that during the Great Moderation period, the fit with
predicted nominal GDP rule matches the actual federal funds rate better than
does the Taylor rule. The overall results counter the conventional view, and
observe that post Volcker era or during the period of Great Moderation (1984-
2007), the Federal Reserve had a stronger implicit preference for nominal GDP
as compared to inflation.
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Table 3.5: Model Comparison
Nominal GDP Rule: rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(α + βEtYt+k)
1983-2006 (Great Moderation Period)
t t+ 1 t+ 2
R2 0.986 0.983 0.981
AIC 0.341 0.520 0.656
BIC 0.391 0.570 0.705
Taylor Rule:rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(α + βEtpit+k + φEtxt+j)
t t+ 1 t+ 2
R2 0.981 0.970 0.982
AIC 0.702 0.682 0.662
BIC 0.753 0.733 0.713
Table 3.6: Relevant NGDP Policy Rule
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)(α + βEtYt+k) t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
1983-2007
β 1.62 1.92 2.21 1.94
(0.66) (0.50) (0.82) (1.50)
ρ 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.97
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.98 0.98 .98 0.98
BIC 0.61 0.39 0.57 0.70
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Table 3.7: Irrelevance of Output Gap
Coefficient of Output gap
Orphanides (2003)
1969:1997 0.14
(0.03)
1969:1979 0.19
(0.04)
1982:1997 0.10
(0.03)
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
Pre -Volcker (1960-79) 0.27
(0.08)
Volcker-Greenspan (1979-96) 0.93
(0.42)
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
Pre-1979 0.48
(0.12)
Post 1982 0.44
(0.16)
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Chapter 4
Does nominal GDP pass the
forecastability test for being a
future monetary policy
framework?
4.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has cast doubts on inflation targeting as an optimal
monetary policy framework. Some have even argued for the death of inflation
targeting during the recent financial crisis (Frankel 2012). Inflation targeting
as a monetary policy framework seems to work better in an economy domi-
nated with demand side shocks, but with supply side shocks it seems to have
problems. This can be a severe constraint during any crisis period which has
large supply shocks. Nominal GDP targeting has been suggested to rectify this
problem as it has been argued to perform better with supply shocks (Woodford
2012).
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Forecast targeting became an important part of the central banking deci-
sion making process especially after inflation targeting became a predominant
monetary policy regime in many countries (Svensson, 1999). Woodford, 2007)
stresses this point succinctly, “In my view, the most important recent develop-
ment with regard to the practical use of policy rules has been the development,
at several central banks since the early 1990s, of methods of forecast targeting,
both as a systematic approach to monetary policy deliberations and as a basis
for communication with the public”.
Inflation targeting is one of the most influential and widespread monetary
policy frameworks that has come to dominate central banking. In this frame-
work, there is an announced numerical target with major emphasis on mon-
etary policy making for inflation forecasts with high degrees of transparency
and accountability. The explicit monetary policy objective of the central banks
in inflation targeting is in the form of a unique numerical target that can be
in the form of levels or a range for annual inflation. Some central banks have
set up a certain horizon during which the inflation target shall meet. However,
having a fixed horizon has its own problems. Some studies have shown that
having a fixed horizon is not appropriate for most circumstances. Therefore,
for resolving such ambiguities an explicit intertemporal loss function as the
operational objective of the central bank has been specified (Svensson 1999).
The quadratic intertemporal loss function is of the following form:
Lt = (1− δ)Et
∞∑
τ=0
δτ [(pit+τ − pi∗)2 + λy2t+τ ] (4.1.1)
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where δ(0 < δ < 1) is the discount factor, pit is the inflation rate whereas
pi∗ is the inflation target, yt is the output gap and λ is the relative weight to
stabilize the output gap. When λ = 0, then we have strict inflation targeting,
whereas when we have λ > 0, the output gap enters the loss function and we
have flexible inflation targeting. When the discount factor reaches one, then
the intertemporal loss function becomes the weighted sum of the unconditional
variances of inflation and output gap:
lim
δ→1
Lt = V ar[pit] + λV ar[yt]
This happens when E[pit] = pi∗and E[yt] = 0.
Price stability has been the primary concern of the central banks but nowa-
days there has been explicit concern not only about inflation but also about the
stability of the real economy. Hence the target variables have been expanded
to include both inflation and output gap. The inclusion of the stability of real
economy has been called “flexible inflation targeting”1. However, it has been
observed that central banks have not been that transparent about the relative
weights attached to the stability of variables apart from inflation.
The second major concern is related to forecasting inflation for a medium
horizon. Since inflation is partially predetermined in the short run due to
sticky prices and wage contracts, monetary policy can only influence expected
future inflation. So the mainly de facto intermediate target of the policy
is forecasting inflation which has also been called in the literature “inflation
1Strict inflation targeting happens when the central bank is exclusively concerned about
inflation, which is a rarity. The monetary framework can also be classified into three different
regimes: (i) full-fledged inflation targeting, (ii) implicit price stability anchor, and (iii)
inflation targeting lite. The regimes are differentiated by the clarity and credibility of the
commitment to the inflation target.(Carare and Stone 2006).
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forecast targeting”(Svensson 1999). For carrying this out the central bank sets
the instrument rate such that forecasts of target variables seem consistent.
In comparison to non-inflation targeting countries, studies have found that
economies have benefited by inflation targeting, especially emerging economies
where the inflation levels, persistence, and volatility have reduced (Roger and
Stone, 2005). In a comprehensive study (Goncalves and Salles, 2008) of 36
emerging economies in which 13 were inflation targeters from 1980 to 2005,
it was found that there was greater fall in inflation and a greater reduction
in growth volatility experienced by emerging market inflation targeting coun-
tries. The study also found that adoption of inflation targeting by emerging
economies did contribute towards the attainment of superior outcomes in terms
of economic performance.
Another monetary policy framework which was suggested as a probable
monetary policy regime in the late 1970s was Nominal GDP targeting. Nom-
inal GDP targeting was suggested to be better than other monetary policy
regimes in stabilizing output and employment (Meade (1978), Tobin (1980),
Corden (1981) and McCallum (1985)). Nominal GDP targeting can be de-
scribed by the following process where the objective of the central bank is to
reduce the loss function given as:
Lt+j = (xt − xt−1 + pit − (4x+ pi)∗)2,
where xt is the nominal GDP rate and pit is the inflation rate. Here the loss
function is an increasing function of the deviations of the nominal GDP growth
from the target (4x + pi)∗.The central bank would not raise the interest rate
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as long as the nominal GDP remains below a deterministic target path which
would be equal to the long average growth rate of real output and target in-
flation rate thus keeping stabilizing inflation and also diminishing fluctuations
in real cyclical aggregates (McCallum and Nelson 1999). Woodford (2012) ar-
gues that nominal GDP targeting would have performed better than inflation
targeting during the recent financial crisis comparing US nominal GDP growth
with a log-linear trend line. Woodford argued that if inflation or real GDP
increased, then according to the Taylor rule the Federal Reserve would have
raised the interest rate. Whereas, if the Federal Reserve follows a nominal
GDP target, then it would not raise the rates until inflation and real growth
reached back to the the trend line.
Another desirable property of nominal GDP targeting is that the objective
of the central bank can be expressed entirely in nominal terms (i.e., monetary
terms). It may be better than inflation targeting as the movements in nominal
spending growth may be more closely and reliably related to central bank
policy actions (open market sales and purchases) and also it would not have
to rely on concepts such as the Phillip curve which have weak consensus in the
profession (McCallum 2011).
Compared to the inflation targeting framework it may have less fluctu-
ations as it can respond to very high and very low growth rates of output
(McCallum and Nelson, 1999). McCallum (1999) has also argued that using
growth rate of nominal GDP also avoids estimating the potential or the nat-
ural rate of output, which has got mismeasurement problems involved. It has
also been argued that nominal GDP targeting dominates not only monetary
targets due to velocity shocks but also an exchange rate target when exchange
rate shocks are large and also dominates a price level target when the supply
shocks are large (Frankel 2012). Henderson and McKibbin (1993), comparing
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monetary targeting, inflation targeting and nominal income targeting for open
economies with different degrees of instrument adjustment and wage persis-
tence also found theoretically and empirically that nominal GDP targeting
dominates pure inflation targeting in the case of supply shocks or shocks to
country risks. Frisch and Staudinger (2002) also find that if the parameters
at the unemployment rate in the central bank’s loss function exceeds a certain
level, then regardless of whether a supply or a demand shock occurs, nominal
GDP targeting is better than inflation targeting.
The debate regarding the efficacy of ‘instrument rules’ and ‘target rules’ has
been a much debated issue in monetary policy literature (Svensson, (2003,2004);
McCallum and Nelson, 2005). An instrument rule is a sort of a formula that
portrays a relation of the monetary instrument as a function of current ob-
served variables (McCallum and Nelson 2005). Famous examples include the
Taylor rule (1993), Henderson - McKibbin rule (1993) and the McCallum rule
(1988) etc.
Forecast targeting became an important component of central banks from
the 1990s onwards as a systematic approach to monetary policy deliberations
and as a good communication medium with the public. Inflation targeting is
a classic example of forecast targeting with the term coined as a substitute by
Svensson(1997) for inflation targeting. Forecast targeting involves a commit-
ment by the central bank to adhere to a certain policy objective and adjust
the main monetary policy instrument in such a way that target criterion is
satisfied. This helps in making monetary policy decisions much more effective.
But this effective dissemination procedure has to be backed by good forecasts.
If the forecasts are way off mark, then it tarnishes the credibility of the central
bank. In this chapter, following the standard tenets of ‘targeting’ based mon-
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etary policy framework, we undertake an exercise of comparing the inflation
targeting and nominal GDP targeting regime, on the basis of their forecast
performance for the US, using a series of models from simple autoregressive
models to standard state space models.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section 4.2 we provide details of
the data. Section 4.3 describes the methodology for evaluating the forecasting
models. Section 4.4 provides the details about the forecasting models. Section
4.5 presents the results. Section 4.6 we present some robustness check. Section
4.7 concludes.
4.2 Data
The data constitutes of quarterly time series of the US economy. The data
has been taken from St. Louis Federal Reserve database (Fred). The series
has been divided into three different samples. The first is the full sample
which consists of the period from 1970Q2:2014Q2, and the other two samples
are from 1970Q2:1983Q4 (the great inflation era) and 1984Q2 to 2007Q4 (the
great moderation era). The variables that have been used in the different
forecasting exercises include nominal GDP, real GDP, implicit GDP deflator,
consumer price index (CPI), PCE (Personal consumption expenditure) and
federal funds rate (FFR).
The data were transformed by first taking the log difference and then taking
the growth rates,except for the federal funds rate which was not transformed
and kept at levels. The transformation was done in the following manner,
yt = 400ln(yt/yt−1)2.
2400 has been used due to quarterly series.
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All the variables that are used for forecasting are stationary. Two standard
unit root tests, ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller ) test and PP (Phillips-Perron)
test were conducted for the variables used for forecasting. The results are
provided in the Appendix A.1. All the variables except the federal funds rate
were tested all the variables were found to be I(1) so were transformed to make
them I(0)..
4.3 Methodology Used for Evaluating Forecasts
4.3.1 Pseudo out-of-sample forecasts
The chapter uses pseudo out-of-sampling measures of predictive content to
undertake the forecasting exercise. For undertaking the pseudo out-of-sample
forecasts, we use a part of the dataset starting from date T=1 to T0. We
estimate the parameters of the model using data to T0 and make the forecast
of the data ˆYT0+h|T0, conditional upon the data till T0. This forecast data is
then compared with the actual data. This exercise is then taken one step ahead
and repeated recursively, and hence in a sense we produce a series of pseudo
out of sample forecasts. Henceforth we quantify and summarize the forecast
errors of this pseudo out of sample forecasting procedure, and then can find
the model that shows the least forecast error. Most studies computing pseudo
out-of-sample forecasting exercise use mean squared forecast errors (MSFE),
which are scale-dependent errors but as we are comparing between the two
different variables, we would require a scale independent error measure so we
use mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). The MAPE is estimated as:
MAPE = 1
T − h− T0 + 1
T−h∑
t=T0
|yt+h − yˆt+h|t|/|yt+h| (4.3.1)
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where T is the last observed value and T0 is the starting observed value for
which pseudo out of sample forecasts are undertaken. yt+his the starting value
observed at the time t+h, whereas yˆt+h|t is the h step ahead forecast given the
information upto time t. In this chapter, we have used two different T0 values
for the three samples. For the full sample from 1970Q2-2014Q2 we have used
T0 = 40, whereas for the other two samples we have used T0 = 18, as total
number of observations are much less in these samples.
4.3.2 Direct Forecasts
In this chapter, most of the forecasts are estimated with direct multi-step
ahead forecasts. Direct forecasts for univariate variables yht+hcan be written
as:
yˆD,ht+h = β +
p∑
i=1
ρˆiyt+i−1 (4.3.2)
where we can construct direct forecasts by using E(yˆD,ht+h| It, θ). In the case when
the model is misspecified, the direct multi-step approach has been found to
provide more accurate forecasts than the iterated multi-step approach ( Mar-
cellino, Stock and Watson 2006). Point forecast using the iterated multi-step
approach has been found to be a more complicated function of the parameter
estimates than using the direct multi-step approach.
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4.4 Forecasting Methods
For the forecasting exercise, several models were constructed. The forecasts
were undertaken at different forecast horizons such as one, two and four quar-
ters for the quarterly data. The forecasting model follows this general form:
yht+h = µ+ α(L)yt + β(L)′Zt + εt+h (4.4.1)
where α(L) is scalar lag polynomial, µ is a constant, β(L) denotes lag polyno-
mial and Zt is a vector of predictor variables.
There are some advantages of using h-step ahead projections. If we require
to simultaneously forecast Zt, with h-step ahead forecasts we are not required
to estimate additional equations. It can reduce the impact of specification
error in one step ahead models by using the same horizon for estimation as
well as for forecasting.
4.4.1 Autoregressive (AR) models
AR models are one of the simple but standard forecasting models in macroe-
conomics time series forecasting. AR models can generally be written as:
(1− φpL)yt = ut, where ut ∼ N(0, σ2) (4.4.2)
Estimation of AR models is reasonably simple as they can be written in the
form of the linear regression model. The AR forecasts can be recursively
calculated in the following form:
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∆̂yt+h|T − µˆ = αˆ1(4̂yT+h−1|T − µˆ) + ....+ αˆp(∆̂yt+h−p|T − µˆ) (4.4.3)
4.4.2 Integrated Moving Average (IMA) models
Unlike AR(q) models which simply require estimating past observations, MA(q)
models requires estimation of unobserved error terms. Typically estimating
MA(q) models requires the Kalman filter, which for evaluating the likelihood
requires a system of recursive equations. Here we follow a different approach
to evaluate the likelihood (Kroese and Chan 2014).
We know that under MA(q) models, Y1.......YT are linear combinations of
T normal random variables ε1.....εT and thus Y = (Y1.....YT ) has multivariate
normal distribution. This process would require manipulating large matrices
for estimation which can be time consuming. One way to resolve this issue is
to utilize the information that MA(q) can be written as sparse matrices which
in turn makes the computation easier.
For evaluating the MA(2) model, we can write the model in matrix form:
y = µ+Hψ (4.4.4)
where µ = (µ1....µT )′,u = (u1.....uT )′ ∼ N(0, σ2).Hψis a banded T × T matrix
that contains only 3(T-1) non zero elements. For MA(2) we have:
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Hψ =

1 0 0 0 0 0 .. . 0
ψ1 1 0 0 0 0 ... .. 0
ψ2 ψ1 1 0 0 0 .. .. 0
0 ψ2 ψ1 1 0 0 .. .. 0
0 0 ψ2 ψ1 1 0 .. .. 0
. 0 0 ψ2 . . .. .. ...
. . . . . . . .. ..
. .. . . 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 0 ψ2 ψ1 1

(4.4.5)
Hence after few changes we have (y|ψ, σ2) ∼ N(0, σ2HψH ′ψ).Hence the loglike-
hood can be written:
l(θ|σ2, y) = −T2 log(2piσ
2)− 12 log|HψH
′
ψ| −
1
2σ2y
′(HψH ′ψ)−1y (4.4.6)
For evaluating the l(θ|σ2, y) it is not necessary to compute the inverse(HψH ′ψ)−1which
can be time consuming. Instead we can obtain the product (HψH ′ψ)−1y which
can be computed by solving the system HH ′ψz = y for z. Integrated moving
average models provide a slight variation of MA models with the dependent
variable written in its first difference.
4.4.3 Unobserved component (UC) model
Unobserved component models are type of state space models which have
this feature of decomposing a time series into trend, seasonal, cyclical and
irregular components and where each process stochastically evolves through
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time. In the basic form, the unobserved component model constitutes two
components, the observed variable yt which is modeled on the state τt, also
called the measurement equation as shown in (4.4.7) below:
yt = τt + εt, εt ∼iid N(0, σ2) (4.4.7)
τt = τt−1 + ut, ut ∼iid N(0, ω2) (4.4.8)
whereas equation (4.4.8) is the transition equation. One of the issues with
unobserved component models is that there can be overfitting of data3. To
resolve such an issue and also to show the evolution of the unobserved variable
over time transition equation can be useful. For understanding the dynamic
properties of a time series this sort of a decomposition is quite useful and pro-
vides good information also of how the components have evolved over time.
In forecasting we are concerned with a single variable but understanding the
dynamic properties and knowing the time series decomposition can be useful in
forecasting. For modeling the evolution of univariate time series such as infla-
tion and nominal GDP, the component τt can be interpreted as the stochastic
trend or underlying inflation or nominal GDP.
4.4.3.1 Estimation
For estimation we would be fixing the values of ω2 and try to obtain the value
of σ2 using the Expectation Maximizing algorithm (EM) (Kroese and Chan,
3If we just use measurement equation, then maximum likelihood estimator for the state
variable τtand parameters σ2may not be defined. This situation can arise due to the sum
of state variables and parameters being greater than the observables. Thus we can have
a unbounded likelihood function and hence perfectly fitting of data. Having a transition
equation is one of the ways to resolve such an issue.
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2014). We would be maximizing the likelihood function in the following way:
L(σ2; y) =
∫
f(y|τ, σ2)f(τ |ω2)dτ (4.4.9)
To estimate with EM algorithm we can write (4.4.7) and (4.4.8) in matrix form
and derive expressions for ln f(y|τ, σ2) and f(τ |ω2)
y = τ + ε, whereε ∼ N(0, σ2I) (4.4.10)
where ε = (ε1......εT ), I is T×T identity matrix. Now we can have a expression
for f(y|τ, σ2) using (4.4.10):
f(y|τ, σ2) = −T2 ln(2piσ
2)− 12σ2 (y − τ)
′(y − τ) (4.4.11)
For deriving an expression for f(τ |ω2), we can write the transition equation as,
Hτ = u, where u ∼ N(0,Ω) and Ω = diag(ω20, ω2......ω2)is a diagonal matrix.
Here we have |det(H)| = 1 and hence H is invertible, so we get:
τ = H−1u ∼ N(0, (H ′Ω−1H)−1 (4.4.12)
where Ω−1is a diagonal matrix. Thus (4.4.11) can be rewritten as:
f(y|τ, σ2) = −T2 ln(2pi)−
T − 1
2 lnω
2 − 12τ
′(H ′Ω−1H)τ (4.4.13)
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Now we implement the expectation process of the EM algorithm, for which we
have to derive the conditional density of the states given y,
gi(τ) = f(τ |y, σ2i−1, ω2) (4.4.14)
where σ2i−1is the current value of σ2in iteration i. For further evaluation we
will show that (τ |y, σ2i−1, ω2)has multivariate normal density. Using (4.4.11)
and (4.4.12) we get:
lnf(τ |y, σ2i−1, ω2) = f(y, τ |σ2i−1, ω2) + c (4.4.15)
where c is a constant ( ignoring constants terms not involving τ). Solving this
we get:
− 12(τ
′Kiτ − 2
σ2i−1
y′τ) + c (4.4.16)
where Ki = H ′Ω−1H +σ−2i−1I and shows probability distribution of the normal
distribution. And resolving further we get,
f(τ |y, σ2i−1, ω2) ∼ N(τˆi, K−1i ) (4.4.17)
where τˆi = σ−2i−1K−1i y.
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Now we compute the expectation using EM algorithm, E- Step of EM algorithm
can ne written:
Qi(σ2) = Egilnf(y|τ, σ2) + c (4.4.18)
= −T2 ln(2piσ
2)− 12σ2 [tr(K
−1
i ) + (y − τˆi)′(y − τˆi)] + c (4.4.19)
Here we have used the assumption E(z′z) = tr(Σ) + µ′µ, where z is a random
vector with mean vector µand covariance matrix Σ.
For getting the M-Step we differentiate Qi(σ2) w.r.t σ2,
σ2i = Qi(σ2) =
1
T
[tr(K−1i ) + (y − τˆi)′(y − τˆi)] (4.4.20)
Thus given Ki and τˆi from the expectation process and updating using (4.12)
we get the estimate of σˆ2.
4.4.4 VAR models
VAR models are one of the most versatile and efficient tools for out of sample
forecasting. Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984), Litterman (1986) were some of
the seminal works in this area. The VAR in lag order notation takes the form:
Yt = C + A(L)Yt−1 + εt (4.4.21)
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where Y = (y1.......yn)’, ε = (ε1.....εn)′and A(L) =
∑m
j=1AjL
j. C and Aj are
n× 1 and n× n parameter matrices respectively. The above equation can be
further written as:
Yt = Λxt−1 + ut, (4.4.22)
= (x′t−1 ⊗ In)β + εt (4.4.23)
where xt = (1, Y
′
t , ......Y
′
t−m+1)′,β = vec (Λ) and Λ = (C, A1, .......Am).
For estimating Λ we use the least square estimator:
Λ̂t = (t−1
t−1∑
s=1
Ys+1x
′
s)(t−1
t−1∑
s=1
xsx
′
s)−1 (4.4.24)
And the covariance matrix Σ can be estimated by:
Σˆ = 1
T
T∑
t=1
(Yt − Λˆxt−1)((Yt − Λˆxt−1)′ (4.4.25)
Now having known the parameters, the forecasts can be constructed. The
h-step ahead recursive VAR forecast can be written as
Yˆt+h = C + A1Yˆt+h−1 + .....+ AmYˆt+h−m. (4.4.26)
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 AR models
AR models have been found in many cases to be better than the benchmark
random walk forecasts. This section summarizes the results of the univariate
autoregressive models with four different lags. Forecasts were made with dif-
ferent horizons, which includes one, two and four ahead inflation and NGDP
growth (h= 1, 2 and 4). In tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 the forecast performance in
the form of MAPE is provided with all the three different samples. In the first
sample which constitutes the full sample from 1970Q2 to 2014Q2 (Table 4.1),
GDP deflator forecast performance is better than all the other variables. The
percentage errors of the NGDP is greater than as compared to the other three
inflation measures. In terms of the three inflation measures, GDP deflator has
the lowest MAPE followed by PCE and the worst forecast performance is of
CPI. In the sample from 1970Q2 to 1983Q4, which was a period of high infla-
tion in the US, the MAPE values were much higher as compared to the other
two samples. Here also the mean absolute percentage errors of GDP deflator
are the least and hence have the best forecast performance. NGDP has the
highest percentage errors as compared to all the three variables and hence its
has the worst forecast performance again in terms of the autoregressive mod-
els. In the third sample also the results are same as compared to the other two
samples with NGDP forecast performance being the worst in the sample. In
the case of AR models for NGDP, for the sample 1970Q2-2014Q2 and 1984Q1-
2007Q4 we find especially for one quarter ahead forecasts the AR(4) model
seems to perform better as compared to the other AR models.
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4.5.2 IMA models
Stock and Watson (2007) found that for forecasting inflation in the US espe-
cially the IMA (1,1) model performs quite well. The reason was due to the
apparent unit root in the inflation and also due to the negative auto-correlation
in the time series data. We here also use the IMA (1,1) model along with the
IMA (1,2) model to compare the forecast performance of NGDP with the three
different inflation variables. First we start comparing the results for the IMA
(1,1) model shown in table 4.4. For the sample from 1970Q2-2014Q2 we find
that NGDP forecasts in terms of mean absolute percentage errors do not per-
form better in terms of MAPE for all the three inflation measures. For one
step ahead forecasts the IMA(1,1) seems to model NGDP better than AR(1),
AR(2), AR(3) except AR(4) where the percentage errors are the same, whereas
with h = 2, 4 we find that AR(4) performs worse than IMA(1,1). For the other
two samples from 1970Q1-1983Q4 and 1984Q1-2007Q4, we find the same pat-
tern of results with NGDP performing worse than all three inflation measures.
In table 4.5 are provided the mean absolute percentage errors for the IMA(1,2)
model. For the IMA(1,2) model also we find that for all the samples NGDP
seem to perform worse than all the three inflation measures.
4.5.3 UC models
UC models seem to fit the NGDP data quite well as compared to earlier AR
models and IMA(1,1) models for the full sample 1970Q2-2014Q2. In the UC
model, the unobserved component τt can be assumed to modeled as inflation
and NGDP separately in our case. The mean absolute percentage errors of
NGDP are much closer to the other inflation measures as compared to earlier
models during 1970Q2-2014Q2, but still NGDP performs worse than all the
three inflation measures.
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4.5.4 VAR models
VAR models have become standard benchmark models for any forecasting
exercise. Most of the central bank projections around the world use VAR
models. We have used a small VAR with three variables and lag of three.
We also tried the results in VAR(2) but was not that different and VAR(3)
results were better. The variables used in all the six VAR models were NGDP
and federal funds rate. For the three NGDP VAR we used different inflation
measures as shown in the parenthesis in table 4.9.
The results in the VAR models are also not different from the above models
as we had expected. For the full sample, 1970Q2-2014Q2, compared to all
three inflation VAR models show better forecast performance than all the
three NGDP VAR models. As in the above models, GDP deflator has the
best forecast performance as shown with the least mean absolute percentage
error. For the second sample from 1970Q2-1983Q4 we again find the same set
of results with NGDP forecasts having the higher values of percentage error.
This pattern also continues for the third sample from 1983Q2-2007Q4.
4.6 Robustness check
One of the issues with using a percentage error for forecast accuracy such as
MAPE is that it has been found to have a bias favoring estimates that are
below the actual values. So when the forecast or the actual values used in the
denominator have values closer to zero percent, the value would be undefined
as it is bounded on the lower end but is unbounded on the upper end. So as a
robustness check we have tried to compare the results using another standard
forecast accuracy measure, root mean squared error (RMSFE). Another issue
that we have dealt in this section is comparing the forecast accuracy of real
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GDP with the earlier nominal GDP and the three inflation measures. The
robustness check is performed for the full sample size from 1970Q2 to 2014Q3.
The RMSFE results for the various models are provided in table 4.10. As
can be gauged from the table, the RMSFE seems to synchronous with MAPE
measures. The forecasting performance of the inflation measures seem to be
again better than both real GDP and nominal GDP. GDP deflator has the best
forecasting performance as compared to all the other variables and nominal
GDP seems to perform the worst.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have compared the forecastability of two monetary policy
regimes by comparing the forecasting performance of its nominal anchors. For
undertaking such a task we have employed different sets of models with multi
step ahead forecasts in three different samples for US. Our forecasting results
finds that in all the models used, inflation as a nominal anchor has better
forecasting performance as compared to NGDP for the US. This study does
not imply that nominal GDP targeting is not a preferable monetary policy
framework, as it has been found to be superior in many other aspects for
being a good monetary policy framework. This study finds that in terms of
standard forecast performance nominal GDP as a potential monetary policy
anchor does not seem to outperform inflation.
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Figure 4.1: CPI, GDP Deflator and PCE
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Table 4.1: AR Models - 1970Q2:2014Q2
AR(1)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.89 5.69 5.85
CPI 2.84 3.36 3.01
PCE 2.47 2.49 2.72
GDP Deflator 1.57 1.67 1.72
AR(2)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.74 5.69 5.98
CPI 2.89 3.35 2.85
PCE 2.45 2.45 2.73
GDP Deflator 1.58 1.66 1.71
AR(3)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.75 5.66 5.94
CPI 2.92 3.24 2.89
PCE 2.41 2.47 2.64
GDP Deflator 1.58 1.68 1.71
AR(4)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.69 5.82 5.96
CPI 2.95 3.30 3.32
PCE 2.40 2.44 2.63
GDP Deflator 1.60 1.69 1.71
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Table 4.2: AR Models - 1970Q2:1983Q4
AR(1)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.49 9.45 9.47
CPI 6.92 7.42 7.37
PCE 5.68 5.66 5.85
GDP Deflator 5.46 5.44 5.58
AR(2)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.51 9.45 9.45
CPI 6.94 7.42 7.37
PCE 5.67 5.65 5.84
GDP Deflator 5.46 5.43 5.57
AR(3)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.53 9.39 9.44
CPI 6.86 7.31 7.50
PCE 5.67 5.65 5.84
GDP Deflator 5.46 5.43 5.59
AR(4)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.56 9.39 9.36
CPI 6.97 7.24 7.60
PCE 5.69 5.69 5.88
GDP Deflator 5.46 5.43 5.57
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Table 4.3: AR Models - 1984Q1:2007Q4
AR(1)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.70 5.59 5.72
CPI 2.13 2.18 2.12
PCE 2.69 2.76 3.11
GDP Deflator 1.32 1.36 1.32
AR(2)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.46 5.64 6.04
CPI 2.13 2.18 2.13
PCE 2.59 2.66 3.13
GDP Deflator 1.34 1.34 1.33
AR(3)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.48 5.71 6.10
CPI 2.15 2.20 2.13
PCE 2.47 2.67 2.98
GDP Deflator 1.33 1.36 1.33
AR(4)
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.43 5.89 6.15
CPI 2.15 2.19 2.13
PCE 2.46 2.64 2.97
GDP Deflator 1.33 1.36 1.33
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Figure 4.2: AR Models: One step ahead forecasts for PCE - 1970Q2:2014Q2
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Figure 4.3: AR Models: One step ahead forecasts for NGDP - 1970Q2:2014Q2
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Figure 4.4: One step ahead forecast for IMA(1,1) Models
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Table 4.4: IMA(1,1) Model
1970Q2 : 2014Q2
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.71 5.72 5.90
CPI 2.90 3.16 2.57
PCE 2.39 2.40 2.65
GDP Deflator 1.64 1.71 1.74
1970Q2 : 1983Q4
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.48 9.48 9.56
CPI 6.91 7.33 7.33
PCE 5.69 5.67 5.85
GDP Deflator 5.47 5.44 5.57
1984Q1 : 2007Q4
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 6.11 6.14 6.23
CPI 2.18 2.23 2.16
PCE 2.43 2.58 2.94
GDP Deflator 1.35 1.37 1.35
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Table 4.5: IMA(1,2) Model
1970Q2 : 2014Q2
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.74 5.64 5.79
CPI 2.71 3.15 2.74
PCE 2.39 2.41 2.65
GDP Deflator 1.64 1.72 1.74
1970Q2 : 1983Q4
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.46 9.46 9.62
CPI 6.68 7.39 7.46
PCE 5.69 5.66 5.85
GDP Deflator 5.47 5.43 5.56
1984Q1 : 2007Q4
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.20 5.41 5.48
CPI 2.09 2.18 2.11
PCE 2.48 2.59 2.89
GDP Deflator 1.35 1.37 1.35
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Table 4.6: UC Model - 1970Q2: 2014Q2
ω = .25
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 3.35 3.39 3.21
CPI 2.15 2.14 1.74
PCE 1.87 1.82 1.98
GDP Deflator 1.40 1.44 1.46
ω = .75
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 3.47 3.51 3.26
CPI 2.25 2.35 1.76
PCE 1.90 1.77 1.87
GDP Deflator 1.37 1.45 1.52
With ω = 1
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 3.44 3.56 3.26
CPI 2.25 2.40 1.87
PCE 1.90 1.77 1.87
GDP Deflator 1.37 1.45 1.52
97
Table 4.7: UC Model - 1970Q2 : 1983Q4
ω = .25
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.51 9.49 9.54
CPI 7.25 7.40 7.84
PCE 5.63 5.60 5.79
GDP Deflator 5.41 5.37 5.51
ω = .75
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.48 9.49 9.57
CPI 7.03 7.30 7.53
PCE 5.69 5.67 5.86
GDP Deflator 5.48 5.45 5.58
With ω = 1
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 9.47 9.48 9.59
CPI 7.00 7.39 7.24
PCE 5.70 5.67 5.86
GDP Deflator 5.48 5.45 5.58
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Table 4.8: UC Model - 1984Q1 : 2007Q4
ω = .25
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.83 5.84 6.36
CPI 2.17 2.22 2.17
PCE 2.29 2.41 2.93
GDP Deflator 1.35 1.41 1.37
ω = .75
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.66 5.44 6.18
CPI 2.16 2.26 2.21
PCE 2.30 2.35 2.86
GDP Deflator 1.35 1.41 1.37
ω = 1
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
NGDP 5.65 5.30 6..08
CPI 2.17 2.27 2.21
PCE 2.30 2.35 2.86
GDP Deflator 1.35 1.41 1.37
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Figure 4.5: One step ahead forecasts of PCE (upper) and NGDP( lower) with
UC models
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Table 4.9: VAR(3) Forecasts (MAPE)
1970:1 – 2014:2
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
CPI 2.83 3.01 3.27
PCE 2.38 2.45 2.63
GDP Deflator 1.52 1.62 1.63
NGDP(Deflator) 5.95 5.75 5.72
NGDP(PCE) 5.91 5.60 5.77
NGDP(CPI) 5.89 5.90 5.86
1970:1 – 1983:4
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
CPI 6.82 7.09 7.50
PCE 5.75 5.83 5.91
GDP Deflator 5.43 5.50 5.55
NGDP(Deflator) 9.40 9.33 9.32
NGDP(PCE) 9.50 9.37 9.35
NGDP(CPI) 9.47 9.51 9.37
1984:1 - 2007:4
Horizon h=1 h=2 h=4
CPI 2.19 2.21 2.48
PCE 2.62 2.92 2.54
GDP Deflator 1.32 1.34 1.75
NGDP(Deflator) 6.09 5.87 5.61
NGDP(PCE) 6.08 5.92 5.12
NGDP(CPI) 6.01 5.85 5.34
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Table 4.10: Robustness Check: RMSFE
NGDP RGDP Deflator CPI PCE
AR(1) 3.09 2.61 0.89 2.22 1.53
AR(2) 2.96 2.58 0.85 2.20 1.51
AR(3) 2.03 2.60 0.84 2.10 1.46
AR(4) 3.02 2.64 0.84 2.17 1.48
UC(ω =0.25) 2.78 2.71 0.86 2.13 1.46
UC(ω =1) 2.72 2.69 0.88 2.30 1.58
IMA(1,1) 2.74 2.65 0.83 2.16 1.48
IMA(1,2) 2.73 2.66 0.82 2.14 1.46
Table 4.11: Unit Root Tests
Vairables4 Test Lags Test Statistic5 McKinnon P-Values
4GDP Deflator ADF 1 -4.07*** 0.008
PP -5.87*** 0.000
4CPI ADF 0 -9.35*** 0.001
PP -4.27*** 0.000
4PCE ADF 1 -4.63*** 0.002
PP -3.21*** 0.001
4NGDP ADF 0 -6.43*** 0.000
PP -2.80*** 0.005
4) All the variables were found to be first difference stationary
5) *** indicate 1 percent level of significance
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The thesis has presented three self-contained chapters on empirical macroeco-
nomics. The thesis has contributed to the literature on exploring the nature
of the volatility of the structural shocks and the macroeconomic variables in
the post-reform period in India. It has also contributed to the literature for
examining the forecasting performance of a new monetary policy regime for
the US economy, and has also contributed to a larger literature of the factors
contributing to the Great Moderation in the US.
5.1 What have we learned?
Chapter 2 has examined the evolution of the volatility of the structural shocks
and macroeconomic variables in a time-varying framework. We found that
time variation is an important feature of the major macroeconomic variables
in India. During the post-reform period 1991 onwards, we detect a sharp
reduction in estimated stochastic volatility for all shocks and variables. Inter-
estingly, during the East Asian crisis the volatility surge is much higher than
observed during the recent global financial crisis. We found that CPI inflation
response to monetary policy shocks are more consistent with industrial output.
This similar response in both the variables in terms of synchronous fluctua-
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tions in volatility was also observed with the univariate stochastic volatility
model for both the variables. We also observed that demand shocks seem to
be persistent unlike supply shocks during the period from 2007-2014.
Chapter 3 explored the role nominal GDP as a monetary policy framework
during the Great Moderation period in the US, and showed that for accom-
plishing its objective of stabilizing inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve
was implicitly targeting nominal GDP. This claim has been corroborated by
estimating different variants of nominal GDP rules and compared with Taylor
rules using both ex-post revised data and real time briefing forecasts of FOMC.
With ex-post revised data, which included also the Volcker period along with
the Great Moderation period (1979Q4-2006Q4), we find a stronger preference
for nominal GDP variable as compared to the inflation in the Taylor rule. This
stronger preference was again found in the two different sets of real time data
(Greenbooks forecasts and briefing forecasts from FOMC meetings). We have
also illustrated that during the Great Moderation period, the fit with the pre-
dicted nominal GDP rule matches the actual federal funds rate better than
does the Taylor rule. The overall results counter the conventional view, and
observe that post-Volcker era or during the period of Great Moderation (1984-
2007), the Federal Reserve had a stronger implicit preference for nominal GDP
as compared to inflation.
Chapter 4 explored whether nominal GDP can pass the forecasting test
to be a monetary policy framework. We examined the forecastability of the
NGDP regime with the inflation targeting framework by comparing the fore-
casting performance of its nominal anchors. This task was undertaken by
using a series of models including Autoregressive models, Integrated Moving
Average models, Vector Autoregression model and Unobserved Components
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model. Our forecasting results found that in all the models used, inflation as
a nominal anchor has better forecasting performance as compared to NGDP
for the US. Thus we find that the US inflation is hard to forecast, but it seems
that nominal GDP is much harder to forecast.
5.2 Future research possibilities
This thesis has opened up a number of avenues for future research. Chapter 2
explored the issue of volatility in the post reform period in India with a three
variable TVP-VAR-SV model. An interesting area of research in the future
would be to explore the transmission of shocks in the economy with a larger
number of variables using a time-varying FAVAR model, and explore whether
there are asymmetries in the propagation mechanism in the good and bad
times.
Chapter 3 explored the role of the nominal GDP as a monetary policy
framework during the Great Moderation, by comparing it with the Taylor rule
in an empirical setup. It can be argued for the sake of robustness, that this
comparison in a DSGE setup should be explored. This can be an interesting
future research area which can also examine the welfare gains from the two
monetary policy frameworks.
Chapter 4 examined the forecastability of the NGDP regime with the in-
flation targeting framework by comparing the forecasting performance of its
nominal anchors for the US economy. This forecasting exercise can be explored
in the case of India, which has recently introduced inflation targeting as its
explicit monetary policy framework.
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